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Executive Summary
Design and implementation of disaster assistance for the Western 
Pacific region differs from the delivery of assistance on the U.S. main­
land. Because of cultural and economic differences, as well as the 
increase in costs and logistical problems, FEMA requested INTERTECT to 
assist in a survey trip and review of recent housing and food assistance 
programs, to include the development of appropriate recommendations that 
can be considered by FEMA as potential options for improved assistance 
delivery.
Due to the varying levels of preparedness, institutional capability 
and resources among the five island groups surveyed, it is clear that 
responsibility for meeting needs in major disasters will continue to be 
borne primarily by federal programs in the near future. However, the 
stated goal of assisting and actively promoting the preparedness and 
response capabilities of the island governments should be more clearly 
reflected in the programs selected for delivery of disaster relief and 
recovery assistance. While these governments may not now have the ability 
to respond with the same degree of managerial and physical resources as 
mainland state and municipal governments, a continuation of near-total 
reliance on external assistance serves to stifle both public and private 
efforts to develop local protection and response capacity.
INTERTECT approached this review by drawing on its long experience in 
disaster management in developing countries to suggest some program models 
that could be adapted to local social and economic situations while still 
fitting within overall FEMA guidelines for assistance. In addition, 
several innovative grant programs were reviewed as possible program models 
for housing assistance. The primary focus of the review was on program 
models as "enabling" approaches, i.e., methods of providing assistance 
which would place more emphasis on local decision-making and support of 
individual recovery efforts.
The importance of integrating vulnerability reduction measures into 
assistance programs has been stressed throughout this report. Interna­
tional relief agencies are becoming increasingly aware of the long-term 
cost effectiveness of active mitigation as a component of overall disaster 
relief programs, when opportunities for and acceptance of change reach 
their peak. In the case of replacement housing, INTERTECT stresses that 
effective mitigation can influence normal building practices, which will 
in turn reduce the potential demand for disaster relief assistance over 
time.
Once a menu of appropriate assistance options has been developed, each 
must be evaluated according to its applicability within the local situa­
tion. In addition to the overall variables of disaster type, magnitude 
and extent, site-specific considerations in the housing sector include the
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number of houses damaged or destroyed, cost/materials used/building 
methods, distance/transport problems, income levels, local construction 
materials available, local builders available and skills level, institu- 
tional/administrative capacity for program support, etc.
We recommend that FEMA follow a twTo—step process in developing guide­
lines for response in the Western Pacific region:
1. Commission a series of Country Profiles (one for each of the five 
political jurisdictions: American Samoa, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands) that will collect concisely and systematically the baseline 
information needed for preparedness and response decision-making.
Most of this data would be compiled from site visits/local interviews 
and from archival and experiential sources in Region IX.
2. Develop program guidelines, or country "plans”, for each of the five 
countries, using the Country Profile data resource as a base for 
defining the most appropriate response options. The option of local 
contracting, for example, may be appropriate for one island group and 
not feasible for another, or a good choice for urbanized but not for 
rural or outer-island areas within the same country. The objective is 
to develop country-relevant programs that can be fairly specific in 
content and implementation, but retain flexibility by their definition 
as options: selection would be based on a post-disaster assessment.
In this process, the program options would already be sifted according 
to cultural, institutional and physical resource variables, as well as 
for disaster magnitude (major, moderate, minor). The plans would also 
identify ongoing preparedness activities such as the development of 
appropriate training for local participants, public awareness activi­
ties and institution-building.
Both the AID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees headquarters in Geneva currently utilize 
the "country profile" approach to collect and disseminate critical 
briefing and resource information for emergency management staff. The 
East-West Center’s Pacific Islands Development Program has also produced 
brief country profiles for many island countries in the South Pacific. 
These projects are useful in illustrating the collection of relevant data 
in an easily-accessible yet simple and inexpensive format. Their value to 
the resp>ective organizations depends on:
--  the initial selection of the types of data to be included;
--  the accuracy of the data collected;
--- the regularity with which they are updated.
While this process may be contracted to outside firms or individuals, 
it cannot be carried out without the participation of Region IX staff and 
of officials involved in local assistance in their respective countries, 
so that everyone who will be involved in the delivery and management of 
assistance in the region helps to define the data needed and has a vested 
interest in using and updating these documents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Structure of the Report
This report is organized into two introductory sections and five 
primary sections that address specific issues. Section I, Introduction, 
describes the background and impetus for the report. Section II, Country 
Briefs, is a description of the regional survey and includes observations 
and documentation of initial impressions about local housing and food 
needs. Section III, Recommendations for Policy Development: Housing and
Food Assistance, proposes a series of recommendations that we feel are 
essential to the process of developing appropriate policies for the Wes­
tern Pacific region. Section IV, The Role of Mitigation, is a brief 
analysis of the role of mitigation in relief programs that operate in 
developing countries, and considerations regarding ways in which FEMA may 
explore the integration of mitigation measures into program objectives and 
response strategies.
Section V, Observations on Appropriate Housing Intervention Policies/ 
Strategies/Methods, describes what we have observed to be critical 
elements that should be considered by FEMA when developing detailed 
housing response strategies for this region. Included in this discussion 
are observations on the opportunities and constraints of several past 
response strategies in the region. This section also describes several 
approach options and outlines the opportunities and constraints inherent 
in each approach. This is meant to act as a resource guide when consider­
ing the implications of establishing a policy framework. These approaches 
are analogous to a "kit of tools".
Section VI, Food Needs Overview, is a discussion of some of the basic 
issues in the assessment and delivery of appropriate forms of food assis­
tance .
Section VII, Program Considerations, provides some additional notes 
for consideration in the overall process of selecting flexible but site- 
specific options for pre-planning and response.
B. Background
FEMA has responded to 11 major disasters in the past 2 1/2 years in 
the Western Pacific Region. Whether this is just an unusually active 
period for natural catastrophic events or an indication of longer-term 
trends remains to be seen. It is, however, indicative of the growing 
magnitude of disaster impact that international relief agencies have noted 
in recent years in the context of developing countries.
What appears to be occurring is that the vulnerability of human 
settlements in developing countries is increasing significantly. The rise 
in population coupled with higher unemployment, increased urbanization, 
depletion of natural resources and diminishing participation in self- 
reliance activities, are creating greater opportunities for natural hazard 
events to interact with human settlements. It has become increasingly 
clear to relief agencies working in developing countries that traditional
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perceptions of the role of relief activities and. methods of intervention 
must be re-evaluated in the context of the growing demand and need for 
assistance as well as of the impact of past intervention assistance. In 
the past year, several agencies have begun to realize that the human and 
financial losses occurring in natural disasters have increased to such an 
extent that the relief system will not be able to cope with them in the 
future; in other words, the perception of "acceptable risk" is changing, 
and with it, the attitude towards the cost-effectiveness of mitigation 
measures.
INTERTECT’s international disaster management experience has taught us 
that assistance is most effective when implemented within an overall 
developmental framework as opposed to an "isolated event" approach. The 
root causes of vulnerability are primarily related to conditions of pover­
ty and lack of resources. While disaster relief programs cannot hope to 
resolve these base issues, programs can be structured in a manner that 
uses available funding in efficient ways that contribute to long-term 
development goals, thus reducing the potential long-term vulnerability.
In addition, the increasing costs mentioned above are now forcing inter­
national agencies to realize that support for local efforts, and 
encouragement of the institutionalization of disaster preparedness and 
n^ il'i-Satian measures, will be the only options for coping with major 
disasters in the future. Thus the "developmentally-sensitive" arguments 
are now being reinforced by economic arguments in favor of protecting life 
and infrastructure from the effects of natural disasters.
As FEMA has experienced, implementation of remote field operations in 
the Western Pacific injects many new issues into the standard operating 
procedures that have been developed for mainland programs. The tremendous 
differences in the basic social and cultural fabric, as well as in the 
overall level of development, between the U.S. and the Western Pacific 
islands require that specific strategies and methods be developed if 
programs are to be effective.
This report offers a series of observations, recommendations and 
strategies that may be useful in policy development. They are intended to 
provide a starting point for inter-agency dialogue as a way for the 
national and regional offices to begin approaching the issues in a colla­
borative effort.
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II. COUNTRY BRIEFS
AMERICAN SAMOA 
A. Locational Data
1. Regional Map
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2. Island-specific Maps
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B. Vulnerability to Hazards
American Samoa is situated, in the Western Pacific Region which is 
susceptible to intense cyclone activity. Cyclones threaten housing 
and crops in five basic ways:
damage or collapse from the forces of high winds;
--  inundation from storm surges;
inundation from flooding caused by heavy rainfall;
--  damage resulting from landslides or mudslides; and
--  coastal erosion.
American Samoa is also susceptible to a lesser extent to earthquakes 
and tsunamis.
C. Survey Activities
The survey team spent 4 days in American Samoa: two days on the main 
island of Tutuila and two days in the Manu’a islands of Tau, Ofu and 
Olosega.
Meetings with American Samoan agencies included the following:
--- Governor
--- Office of the Attorney General
--  Public Works
--  The Development Bank
--- Samoa News
--- Local building materials suppliers
--- Hudson Construction (private contractor working on FEMA housing
reconstruction contract)
When not involved in meetings, the survey team documented both local 
housing types and units constructed as part of FEMA assistance pro­
grams.
D. Housing Overview
1* Common housing types: The housing types surveyed on Tutuila and
the Manu’a islands are categorized generally as "transitional",
i.e., current typologies are moving away from both traditional 
building forms and traditional materials.
Urbanized areas such as Pago—Pago have for the most p>art departed 
completely from traditional forms, while in the rural areas there 
are still links to the inherited tradition.
The traditional Samoan house referred to as a "fale" was origin­
ally constructed using heavy timber poles embedded in the ground 
a few feet apart, forming a rectangular perimeter of columns.
The posts supported a steeply-pitched roof constructed of
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lightweight timber poles crisscrossed and lashed together to form 
a shell for the roof thatching. The ends were traditionally 
rounded.
Fales were always open-air houses with raised floors two feet or 
more above the ground level. Woven mats were used as blinds in 
lieu of permanent walls. Many sizes and forms of fales were 
constructed depending on family needs or on ceremonial/cultural 
determinants. Fales also served as family/village meeting 
houses, segregated for use by either males or females.
The fale is not an extinct house type. While construction 
materials and methods may have changed, there is still a very 
strong cultural link to this housing form, and distinct uses of 
different types of fales are obvious in the current social and 
cultural structure.
Housing types have evolved to fit current social perceptions 
about suitability and needs, as well as to reflect western 
influences on form. More recent housing trends represent a 
change in attitude about what constitutes an appropriate housing 
type, and they reflect the overall forces of change within the 
society. Generally, houses in rural areas are still constructed 
without integral kitchens or toilet facilities, while urban areas 
may have more "westernized" types with facilities not included in 
the majority of housing.
2. Housing process: The Samoan housing process generally takes
place incrementally over a long period of time. Family relation­
ships in American Samoa affect opportunities to obtain suitable 
land and resources.
Housing normally seems to begin as a modest construction of less 
permanent materials. The size of a dwelling may increase over 
time, still primarily using wood framing, wood siding and corru­
gated sheet metal roofing. The transition to more permanent 
materials, such as concrete block or more substantial wood 
framing and cladding, depends largely on economic opportunities. 
Families may pool resources to fund a major upgrading or to build 
a completely new house.
Often skilled labor is contracted through extended family net­
works or to local skilled individuals. Western Samoans have been 
providing the vast majority of skilled construction labor in 
American Samoa.
3. Land tenure: All land in American Samoa is communally-owned by
families. The strong cultural traditions of family systems 
influence almost every facet of Samoan life from politics to 
housing.
Land tenure is customarily determined by the position of a family 
within the extended family hierarchy. Family members have dif­
ferent roles and responsibilities based on lineage and cultural
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traditions. Those in positions of leadership and decision-making 
are referred to as "Matai". Usually the head of a family group, 
called a "Sa’o", acts as trustee of the communally-owned land.
Decision-making regarding land tenure, as well as other family- 
oriented issues, is embedded in a complex cultural network that 
is not easily apparent. These complexities have a very direct 
impact on housing assistance efforts.
Villages are organized on the basis of family structures in terms 
of both land tenure status and defining the function and uses of 
housing within a village. It is difficult for outsiders to 
define the internal relationships which determine to a large 
degree the specific uses of different housing units, e.g., deter­
mination of what is a family’s "primary" house.
4. Local institutional support: There did not appear to be any
development programs geared to the housing market, either public 
or private, at the time of this survey. It should be noted that 
the traditional funding resources for housing in the U.S.
(savings-and-loans, banks) have not issued housing mortgages in 
American Samoa. Loans are only available as short-term unsecured 
personal loans. While average income levels might not allow 
people to qualify for mortgage assistance if it did exist, it is 
important to realize that the housing process for almost all 
Samoans is both long and incremental, in part because of the lack 
of institutional support by banks, etc.
During the past year, the Development Bank of American Samoa has 
begun to make housing mortgage loans. The Bank is under the 
leadership of a board of directors appointed by the governor. It 
acts as a guarantee agent for private banks and also is respon­
sible for administering the mortgage and construction process. A 
recent change in the deed of trust regulations now permits the 
Bank to secure the loan using a 55-year land-lease agreement 
between the Sa’o and the homeowner to secure the loan.
The average housing loan is $21,000 and the range is between 
$3,000 and $30,000, which services home improvements as well as 
new home construction. The Development Bank has a small adminis­
trative staff, including one inspector to verify draws and 
material orders. The inspector must sign each request for 
purchase of materials. In talking with Mrs. Frances Malala, 
Vice-President, she stated that the average construction period 
was about 5-6 months. The Development Bank has completed 30 
construction loans and currently has 25 loans in process; there 
are 1400 applicants on the waiting list.
The Bank requires that a licensed contractor be used; however, it 
is typical for the contractor to subcontract portions of the work 
back to the family.
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The Development Bank has just been approved to administer a HUD 
mortgage guarantee loan program. An initial test program of five 
houses is currently underway.
Other than the Development Bank, the survey team was able to 
identify one additional resource for housing support, the Farmers 
Home Administration. FmHA administers personal loans for housing 
improvements up to $2,500. We were unable to interview the 
Samoan representative during this survey.
No building trade schools are operating in American Samoa.
Building materials are available from a number of different 
suppliers on Tutuila. Supply lines are generally very good from 
the U.S. and, while stocks are insufficient to supply the demands 
following a major disaster, resupply should be relatively rapid 
for private suppliers. All materials are shipped by government 
vessels to the outer islands, as no remote suppliers exist.
Public Works maintains some limited lumber and cement supplies 
for project use.
E. Food Needs Overview
1. Agricultural base: American Samoa has only one significant cash
crop: coconut. Tuna canning represents the only major industry. 
Although local fishing does not supply the cannery, residents 
depend on fishing primarily as a subsistence activity and, to a 
lesser degree, as a cash-generating activity for local markets.
The primary diet consists of fish, taro, breadfruit and fruit 
obtained from local growers and fishermen, supplemented by impor­
ted rice and canned foods. While pigs represent a food resource, 
they are mostly eaten only at ceremonial feasts or on special 
occasions.
While traditional American Samoa practiced subsistence agricul­
ture, the society has gradually become more dependent on non- 
traditional imported food resources. A larger percentage of the 
daily diet is now purchased rather than grown by families in 
urban areas, and this trend is also seen in rural areas.
Small food shops have proliferated throughout the main island of 
Tutuila and to a lesser extent in the Manu’a islands, and have 
become increasingly important as food resources for villages.
2. Vulnerability: Cyclonic storms can have a significant effect on
local crop production. Taro, which can be considered one of the 
most important staples of the local diet, is most affected by 
inundation and airborne salt infiltration. This can signifi­
cantly retard replanting cycles. Fruit crops such as bananas are 
affected as well by strong winds. Bananas regenerate relatively 
quickly and, while not important as a cash crop, they are impor­
tant as a local staple.
Response to emergency feeding needs is channeled through the 
USDA-sponsored school feeding programs.
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MARSHALL ISLANDS: Majuro, Ailinglapalap, Ebeye
A. Locational Data
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B. Vulnerability to Hazards
n
n
The Marshall Islands are located in the Western Pacific region, 
approximately 2200 nautical miles west of Hawaii, and are susceptible 
to intense cyclonic activity.
C. Survey Activities
The survey team spent 5 days in the Marshall Islands: three days in 
Majuro, half a day in Ailinglapalap, one day in Kwajalein and one day 
in Ebeye.
Meetings with Marshall Island agencies and representatives included 
the following:
Majuro: --  Emergency disaster office - Majuro
--  Governor's office
--  Joint government/private sector meeting
--  Department of Education
--  Private building materials supplier (Robert Reimers)
and Credit Union
--  FEMA agricultural consultant
Ebeye: Mayor
KADA (Kwajalein Atoll Development Agency)
When not involved in meetings, the survey team documented both local 
housing types and housing constructed as part of FEMA assistance pro­
grams .
D. Housing Overview
1. Common housing types:
Majuro/Ailinglapalap. The housing types surveyed are largely 
"transitional". The vast majority of both urban and rural 
housing is constructed using untreated light wood framing with 
untreated plywood siding. Roofs are generally low-pitch with 
corrugated metal sheeting. Windows are constructed as op>erable 
plywood awnings or are a mixture of either glass louver or 
locally-made wood casement type.
Most units are relatively small, averaging about 12 feet in width 
by 24 feet in length. Floors are either concrete, packed earth 
or elevated wood boards.
In remote villages such as Ailinglapalap, there is more use of 
traditional palm leaf and thatch materials in housing construc­
tion, although in our survey this type represented a small 
portion of the total housing stock.
Upgrading of housing is evident in some areas where concrete 
block wall construction and raised concrete floors are used.
This represents a very small percentage of housing units in the 
areas surveyed.
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Houses constructed as part of the FEMA reconstruction activities 
in Majuro are also wood frame with plywood siding and metal 
roofing. All reconstructed units are built on raised concrete 
floor slabs.
Ebeye. Housing on Ebeye represents a very different circumstance 
from that found on any of the other islands surveyed. Housing is 
very dense and is a mixture of old military barracks and block 
after block of attached housirg units built in ’’barracks" form. 
The primary materials are light wood framing with untreated 
plywood siding and corrugated metal roofing. While some concrete 
and masonry construction is found, it is scattered and represents 
a relatively small percentage of the total housing stock.
In addition, Ebeye has the only significant amount of multi-story 
housing (other than Guam) surveyed during this tour.
2. Housing process:
Majuro/Ailinglapalap. Given the relatively low-income status of 
the majority of Majuro inhabitants, the standard of housing is in 
general very poor. The housing process is largely one where the 
family is responsible for construction. Usually some skilled 
labor can be found within the family network for either no cost 
or relatively little cost. This informal network is responsible 
for the vast majority of housing construction. Upgraded housing 
units using primarily concrete or masonry materials may be built 
using contracted skilled labor. Filipinos make up a large seg­
ment of the skilled labor force used in construction.
While some upgrading is evident, families remain in minimal hous­
ing units for very long periods of time. Most resources will be 
expended on repairing existing structures, as opposed to upgrad­
ing materials or making additions. Using more modern materials, 
such as plywood and metal roofing, requires that families depend 
on economic resources to fund housing improvement versus the 
typical housing patterns that utilized local materials. The 
housing process can be characterized generally as owner- or 
family-built using collective or individual savings to finance 
materials purchases.
Ebeye. The housing process on Ebeye is similar in many respects 
to Majuro. Construction of the typical units does not require a 
very high skill level. Our interviews confirmed that informal 
networks provide opportunities for obtaining the necessary 
skilled labor required, either through family or friends. More 
sophisticated construction requiring a greater skill level, such 
as concrete and masonry, may be contracted out to tradesmen.
Again, Filipinos are the primary resource of skilled construction 
labor.
In many cases, housing units are rented by the Marshallese 
government in Ebeye and represent a form of public housing. This 
is the case with old military barracks that are now occupied as 
family housing.
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3. Land tenure (Majuro/Ailinglapalap/Ebeye): The traditional social
structure of Marshall Island culture still determines land tenure 
status. The Marshalls have a matrilineal society; land is owned 
by families and passed down through this structure. The matri­
lineal structure is quite complicated and its impact on housing 
and settlement location must be examined in greater detail.
In general, each family member may have access to different 
levels of land-use rights according to agreements within the 
family and depending on the person's position in the matrilineal 
hierarchy. Land may be divided into parcels. Each parcel has a 
designated "steward" and each steward may have several workers 
who are allowed to farm land and may construct a house on the 
land, although ownership resides with the matrilineal head of the 
family.
All land disputes are mediated through a separate legal process.
A council of "Iroij" (traditional family leaders) rules on all 
disputes and is responsible for processing all lease agreements. 
Families may enter into long-term lease agreements with indivi­
duals or businesses outside of the family.
4* Local institutional support: As in American Samoa, banks have
not been involved in major financing of housing construction. 
Government mortgage assistance is limited by the same provisions 
that have limited private banks, that is, the legal mandate that 
land cannot be owned by foreign interests. This does not allow 
for a secured loan, so no opportunities were available in the 
past.
Currently, legislation is being drafted to revise the Deed of 
Trust regulations and formal surveys coupled with long-term lease 
agreements will provide the necessary security for obtaining 
housing mortgages.
In the past, the Marshall Islands Department of Social Services 
has administered some government-subsidized housing assistance 
programs funded through CDBG funds. These funds have vanished 
and housing loans must be funded from another source. Existing 
loans are administered through Social Services. A new director 
has just been appointed; however, no new funding resources have 
been allocated. Typically this program would fund 8-10 housing 
construction projects per year, covering both new construction 
and renovation.
This Department does not at this time have either adequate staff 
or funding to contribute to local housing needs.
In Ebeye, the recently-formed Kwajalein Atoll Development Author­
ity (KADA) may become a resource for supporting housing. KADA is 
responsible for administering the construction of replacement 
housing after Cyclone Roy and will be managing the government- 
leased housing as public housing. The Authority will develop 
their own standards for redevelopment programs, as well as 
establishing permitted densities.
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Local government in Ebeye is currently preparing building code 
standards. No standards are now enforced in the Marshall Islands 
and it appears doubtful that such standards will have a signifi­
cant impact on housing construction in the Marshall Islands in 
the foreseeable future.
In Majuro, there is an on-the-job training program for tradesmen 
that pays 50% of a trainee’s salary. Some construction trades 
are involved, and other trades such as boat-building are funded 
as well. Regional training centers are available and are used 
(although not to any great degree) by the Marshallese. These 
include the Ponape Agricultural & Trade School and the Micro- 
nesian Occupational College.
Additionally, a Marshall Islands Development Bank has been 
created to assist local development needs and preliminary funding 
commitments have been secured. The bank had not been fully 
established at the time of this survey.
The FmHA also has an office in Majuro and administers housing 
improvement loans of up to $2500.
There are two major building material suppliers servicing the 
Marshall Islands: Robert Reimers and CIP. Both are located in 
Majuro, with Reimers also maintaining a branch in Ebeye. All 
materials must be transported to other islands primarily by 
government boats, consisting of one LCU and one large micro-class 
vessel. Smaller private boats will take some materials to outer 
islands under private contract, but this represents a very 
limited capacity. A typical circuit to the outer islands takes 
about 3 1/2 weeks.
E. Food Needs Overview
Many basic foods are now imported into the Marshall Islands. Tradi­
tional diets of taro, breadfruit, local fruits such as bananas and 
mango, and fish are supplemented by imported foods; imported rice has 
become a major staple and canned foods are used more and more. Coco­
nut is the only significant cash crop in the islands. Exchange for 
buying/selling of other local crops is limited to a few larger 
markets.
As in most of the other western Pacific territories, the Marshalls 
have become more dependent on cash economies versus maintaining self- 
reliance on locally-produced foods. The small food shops play an 
increasing role in supporting the food needs of both rural and urban 
communities.
The USDA school lunch program in the Marshall Islands has been the 
traditional resource for emergency feeding programs in the p>ast. This 
program is in its last year of funding by the U.S. and no commitment 
has yet been made to continue funding for the program.
There is no formal Red Cross organization functioning at this time in 
the Marshall Islands.
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PONAPE
A . Locational Data
PONAPE
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B. Vulnerability to Hazards
Ponape is situated in the western Pacific, west of the Marshall 
Islands. These islands are susceptible to intense cyclonic storms 
and, to a lesser extent, to earthquakes and tsunamis.
C. Survey Activities
The survey team spent 1 1/2 days in Ponape. During this time we were 
able to survey typical housing types in rural areas and in the urban 
area of Ponape. We met with the Governor and with the Micronesian 
Disaster Coordinating Officer, Ehson Johnson.
D. Housing Overview
1. Common housing types: Given the limited time frame, we were only
able to document typical housing types in several areas. Like 
many other islands surveyed, Ponape housing is generally transi­
tional in form. Many different configurations and materials are 
in wide use. While some local materials such as mangrove wood 
are used, most housing is constructed using light wood framing 
and plywood siding with corrugated metal roofing.
A substantial amount of housing is constructed using concrete and 
masonry materials, particularly around the capital city of 
Ponape.
2. Housing process: Housing is generally constructed by family
networks, with contractors being used for the more expensive 
concrete/masonry construction. We were unable to determine other 
characteristics but it is safe to assume, given the general 
economic constraints, that the process is similar to Truk: a 
gradual process of improvement and, when economically feasible, a 
major rebuilding using concrete and masonry materials.
3. Land tenure: Land in Ponape is privately-owned, not usually
leased.
4. Local institutional support: Ponape has a Housing Authority that
issues housing improvement and construction loans for low-income 
families. The Authority will sell building materials directly to 
families. The Authority does not require a contractor if the 
total cost of the house is under $15,000. Loans are repaid with 
4% interest.
There is a local development bank that issues housing and small 
farming loans but it is not very strong at the moment. A train­
ing institute is operating in Ponape and is funded in part by the 
UNDP. This serves as a regional training resource.
FmHA also issues loans but is limited to $2,500 per loan. The 
prohibition against alien ownership of land prevents banks from 
issuing housing mortgages.
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There are several local building materials suppliers in Ponape. 
Materials must be shipped to the seven outer islands. The 
government operates two cargo vessels: one micro-class boat and 
one LCU. The typical cargo circuit to the outer islands takes 
about one month.
E . Food Needs Overview
Ponape has two primary cash crop resources: pepper and coconuts. 
Coconut production continues to decline in Ponape. Many small farmers 
produce pepper as a major income-generator.
The typical diet includes yams, breadfruit, fish and local fruits such 
as bananas and mango. Much of the population is purchasing a greater 
proportion of their normal food needs in the form of imported foods 
such as rice, sugar, powdered milk and canned foods.
There is currently no Red Cross organization in FSM. There is no real 
direction by FSM government to secure an agreement with the Inter­
national Red Cross.
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TRUK
A . Locational Data
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TRUK
B. Vulnerability to Disasters
Many of the islands in the Truk group are of volcanic origin. They 
are susceptible to cyclonic storms, earthquakes and tsunamis.
C. Survey Activities
The survey team spent 2 days in Truk State. During this time the team 
conducted field surveys of typical housing types on the main island of 
Moen and on one of the lagoon islands, Dublon. During the field 
survey, we also inspected reconstruction sites for individual houses 
which were part of the FEMA assistance program after the 1987 Cyclone 
Nina.
A number of meetings were held with local officials and agencies, 
including:
--  Governor *s office;
State Cabinet meeting including the Central Coordinating 
Committee for Disaster Response
--  Truk Housing Authority
--  Public Works Department
--  Truk Planning Office
--  Local building materials suppliers
D. Housing Overview
1* Common housing types: Housing types in Truk are similar to those
found in Ponape in many respects. A notable difference is the 
increased use of tilt-up concrete wall construction on the island 
of Moen. Four-inch-thick wall panels with large areas punched 
out for windows and doors are cast in forms on the site and 
tilted up into place. The joints between the panels are made by 
pouring in place concrete posts which anchor each panel.
While tilt-up concrete is gaining popularity as a relatively low- 
cost construction method, it represents a fairly small percentage 
of the total housing stock. Both rural areas and settlements on 
the lagoon islands and outer islands consist primarily of wood 
frame houses with either board siding or plywood siding and 
corrugated metal roofs. Some wood frame houses use corrugated 
metal for siding as well.
Typical housing sizes range from about 12’ x 16' upwards.
2. Housing process: Housebuilding in Truk is an incremental process
that occurs over a long period of time. Typically houses are 
built by cooperative efforts within a family or an extended 
family. This is particularly true in the rural lagoon islands 
and in the outer islands. Housing on Moen may be built partially 
by hired labor, particularly in the urbanized areas around Moen. 
This is usually the case in upgraded housing where concrete 
and/or masonry is the primary material.
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Traditional thatch houses using local palm leaves and mangrove 
wood are still constructed in the rural lagoon islands and the 
outer islands. The general trend, though, is to upgrade to more 
permanent materials.
Again, the construction of housing using both plywood or con- 
crete/masonry takes place after a very long timespan in which 
enough money has been saved to buy the materials.
3. Land tenure: Land ownership is generally a lineage right and is
passed down through the women’s side of the family, i.e., matri- 
lineally. Most houses have "the right" to use the land. There 
are some provisions to sell the land to those outside the family; 
however, there are many signatories within a family that have to 
agree to the sale. Land is surveyed and registered as a condi­
tion of the transfer of property.
4* Local Institutional Support: Truk has both a Housing Authority
and a Development Bank. The Housing Authority does issue housing 
loans to low-income people; however, funding is currently not 
sufficient to make new loans. The traditional CDBG funding 
source has now been eliminated so refunding must be secured from 
as yet undetermined sources. The loan limit for new construction 
or repairs is $10,000 and is repaid at 4% interest over 10 
years. No down payment is required.
The Authority has six administrative staff positions and one 
housing inspector. Currently there are plans to hire and train 
more inspectors. At present, the agency seems disorganized and 
inadequately staffed and funded.
The Farmers Home Administration is located on Moen and issues the 
standard $2500 short-term loan. Truk is drafting a new deed of 
trust law that will enable FmHA to issue more substantial loans 
through a local agent (tentatively the Housing Authority). The 
alienation requirement preventing foreign interests from owning 
land prevents the private banking institutions from issuing 
housing mortgages.
There is no local training institute for tradesmen. Several 
people each year are trained in Ponape in varying skills. The 
U.S. Navy O.I.C.C. will occasionally train seme inspectors from 
the Truk Planning Department. This represents a potential 
regional resource.
There are no local building codes or standards for Truk State for 
either public or private construction. FmHA uses some internal 
level of standards. Technical, architectural or engineering 
expertise is very limited.
Transportation of building materials is a constraint for both the 
lagoon islands and in particular the outer islands. The Truk 
Transportation Department operates one LCU and has two micro­
class boats as well. Much of the materials transport within the 
lagoon is accomplished by small private boats. However, the cost
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can be very high if transportation is contracted out. Many 
people use family networks and make 10-12 trips in small fiber­
glass fishing boats to collect materials.
E. Food Needs Overview
Local interviews indicate that the more rural lagoon islands and the 
outer islands still primarily practice subsistence farming and 
fishing. The standard diet consists of breadfruit, taro, potatoes, 
fish and bananas. In the more accessible lagoon islands such as 
Dublon, and in Moen, less farming takes place and there is a greater 
dependence on purchased food goods from local markets and increasingly 
from imported sources. Typically rice, sugar, canned milk and canned 
foods have become standard food items. The presence of the employment 
center in Moen fosters this change in both diet type and method of 
procurement. Increasing dependence on government employment and 
growing urbanization have also reduced the traditional capacity of 
Moen farmers who at one time supplied a large proportion of the food 
resources for the other lagoon island settlements.
Small food shops are increasingly important as food resource centers 
on the island of Moen.
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B. Vulnerability to Disasters
Saipan is situated in the western Pacific north of Guam and Rota, and 
is susceptible to intense cyclonic storms.
C. Survey Activities
The survey team spent one day in Saipan. We were able to survey some 
of the housing units constructed after the 1986 Cyclone Kim. In addi­
tion, meetings were held with the following agencies:
--  Office of the Governor
--  Saipan Disaster Coordination Office (Jim Reyes)
--  Farmers Home Administration
--  Public Works
--  Marianas Island Housing Authority
D. Housing Overview
1. Common housing types: Our field survey was very brief, confined
to a limited area of the island. Saipan is much more developed 
than any of the other islands surveyed. A booming tourist 
industry has spawned construction of many hotels and there seem 
to be some benefits that trickle down to the local population.
Saipan has a large percentage of housing constructed with con­
crete and masonry. While there seems to be an equal number of 
wood frame houses with plywood or board siding, housing standards 
are generally somewhat higher than in the other regions surveyed.
Saipan is rapidly urbanizing and, as the population is growing 
rapidly, much higher densities can be expected in the future. 
Currently there are limited numbers of high-end rental units 
being constructed in the urban areas.
Many families live in what could be described as ’’compounds" 
consisting of one or two primary houses and several smaller ones 
clustered on the property housing older siblings or extended 
family members. These are minimal structures, used mainly for 
sleeping.
2. Housing process: Again the housing process is incremental:
housing built in stages over a long period of time. Banks are 
not involved in issuing housing mortgages, so any financing is in 
the form of short-term personal loans.
There are many small contractors who are responsible for building 
the majority of upgraded housing, constructed of concrete and 
masonry materials. Filipino labor is the primary skilled labor 
force and is active in housing reconstruction.
There is still a large percentage of housing built using family 
labor resources without outside contracting. This follows the 
patterns of other islands surveyed, yet in Saipan there is a much 
greater percentage of contractor-built housing.
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Land tenure: Land tenure is established primarily through the
purchase of plots from owners. Long-term leases are also nego­
tiated. The system is fairly open, yet foreign interests are 
still prohibited from owning land.
Local institutional support; The Marianas Island Housing Author­
ity has been very active in providing "Section 8” housing and 
developing land for housing. Currently they do not have a long­
term housing loan program. The Authority does have technical 
assistance capabilities with one architectural draftsman and one 
engineer on staff as well as three building inspectors. The 
Authority assisted FEMA in Rota by providing a housing inspector 
for the loan program there.
Adequate funding resources remain a problem. The Authority tried 
to float bonds to raise money for a housing construction project 
but has had to forfeit funds because of implementation difficul­
ties .
The Farmers Home Administration Office offers the only long-term 
housing loan assistance. The FmHA uses the Housing Authority as 
the local trustee for issuing loans. FHA uses CARBO building 
code standards to evaluate units. Applicants must have blue­
prints and a certified contractor. Local contractors cannot 
obtain bonding, so FmHA retains 40% of the total contract 
amount. FmHA cannot make a loan if there is no water or power 
for the site.
The average loan is about $40,000 for 20 years. Most of their 
clients work for the Commonwealth government.
FmHA also administers a repair and renovation program, financing 
up to $2,500 in improvements.
Saipan has no local zoning or building codes at present. The 
Public Works Department is currently developing both zoning and 
building code standards. There are also government-sponsored 
homesteading programs that offer building sites to citizens of 
Saipan. The homesteading areas are not generally serviced with 
sewer and water.
26
ROTA
A. Locational Data
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ROTA
Vulnerability to Hazards
Rota is located in the western Pacific, south of Saipan and just north 
of Guam, and is susceptible to cyclonic storms.
Survey Activities
The survey team spent one day in Rota. We divided the time between a 
general field survey of the replacement housing units built under FEMA 
assistance and a meeting with the Mayor of Rota and his staff respon­
sible for local administration of disaster recovery efforts.
Housing Overview
1* Common housing types: Housing on Rota is characterized by a
significant trend in upgrading existing housing stock and a large 
percentage of new construction. Most of the newly-constructed 
houses are built using concrete and masonry, with flat concrete 
roofs. Locally this is perceived to be a very strong house, able 
to withstand cyclone-force winds, whereas wooden houses are 
considered vulnerable no matter how well they are constructed.
The general developmental standards on Rota appear to be much 
higher than those of the Marshalls or FSM. A great deal of 
’'second-home" construction appears to be occurring in outlying 
areas of Rota. In and around the major settlement areas, there 
are significant numbers of older houses constructed with wood 
framing and board siding. However, it is clear that the trend is 
toward building with concrete and masonry. Initial construction 
of these units seems to average about 400 sq. ft. Windows are 
generally either metal frame sliders or glass jalousies purchased 
from Guam.
2. Housing process: The housing process in Rota relies heavily on
Filipino skilled labor, usually hired either hourly or on a lump­
sum basis. There are several local contractors responsible for 
the majority of housing construction. Again there is no long­
term financing available other than the Farmers Home Administra­
tion in Saipan, so the process is incremental. There are many 
half-completed houses scattered throughout major settlement 
areas. People tend to save enough money to construct sections at 
a time.
3. Land tenure: see Saipan.
4. Local institutional support: All institutional support comes
from Saipan. Some building materials can be purchased locally 
(e.g., concrete block), but most materials are shipped over from 
Guam.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT: HOUSING AND FOOD ASSISTANCE
It is clear that the islands surveyed during this assignment share 
many of the fundamental characteristics of developing countries. These 
characteristics influence both the way that post-disaster relief efforts 
must be structured and the kinds of assistance to be provided. Neither 
program strategies nor specific assistance, designed and developed to 
operate in the context of the mainland U.S., are totally transferable to 
insular areas of the Pacific. The differences in cultural, economic, 
social and developmental characteristics are far too great to assume that 
what may be an effective response in Colorado or Pennsylvania will be 
equally as effective in the Pacific islands. While the most obvious 
frustrations for program operations may lie in the constant breakdown of 
such things as logistics support, it is really a basic difference in the 
total operating environment that must be addressed. This disparity is 
best understood by regional field staff who must coordinate or implement a 
relief program that is structured primarily for U.S.-based assistance.
The problems are much the same, whether the response is in the South 
Pacific, the Caribbean or Latin America: the fundamental resources and 
support networks, upon which federal disaster assistance programs rely and 
with which they are coordinated, are largely non-existent or operate in a 
very different manner in developing countries.
A very simple table of comparison can be instructive in beginning to 
understand some of the differences relative to the essential structures 
and resources that allow U.S.-based programs to operate effectively and 
with specific objectives:
U.S. Pacific Islands
Good policy framework Little or none that are active
Extensive insurance 
coverage —  gov’t and 
private
None in rural areas; estimated 
at less than 1% of urban housing/ 
personal property covered
Extensive housing 
financing —  gov’t 
and private
Vast majority have no access to hous­
ing mortgages; on many islands this is 
unavailable
Extensive rental resources Almost none with exception of Guam
Government housing 
assistance programs
Very limited
Formal disaster response 
infrastrueture: federal/ 
state/county/city
Very limited; Public Works, some 
Red Cross; often no clear response 
framework
Extensive & back-up 
communicat i ons
Limited; little back-up in rural 
areas, remote islands
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u.s. Pacific Islands
Extensive transportation Limited at best, even for normal needs
resources - public/private
Diversified economy/ 
agriculture
Very limited diversification
Extensive construction 
capabilities
Very limited
Numerous professionals 
available
Very limited
In the U.S, we have developed the necessary legal procedures, response 
networks and infrastructure required to effectively support the basic 
disaster assistance policy, assumptions and fulfill the mandate. We have 
legislated protection through adoption and enforcement of building codes, 
land-use planning and required insurance coverage. All of these vehicles 
are notably absent in the vast majority of the Western Pacific terri­
tories .
Given their current status, it will take a long-term developmental 
process to establish the framework and regulatory capabilities that make 
such mechanisms effective. For most of the Pacific island countries, such 
controls as building codes will not be effective in the informal building 
sector that is FEMA’s primary focus for housing assistance in the fore­
seeable future.
While post-disaster needs are the same —  depending upon the specific 
disaster event, assistance may be needed in the construction, economic and 
agricultural sectors as well as providing temporary food, water and health 
assistance —  the methods of meeting those needs, and the types of 
material aid provided, should be different. Thus, in order for FEMA to 
begin constructing appropriate relief programs for these islands, the 
issues must be taken out of the context of U.S.-based strategies and 
viewed within the context of these developing and changing societies. 
Rationales for policies and procedures are most effective if built from 
the ground up rather than trying to force-fit interpretations of Public 
Law 93-288 into strategies for implementation.
While operations must be conducted within the parameters set forth in 
FEMA's mandate, it is possible to develop a cohesive set of policies with­
in that framework based on a clear assessment of region-specific goals and 
issues. The mandate provides the flexibility for implementing specific 
planning and response strategies.
A. Observations
Widespread poverty in the Pacific territories, coupled with increasing 
population growth and urbanization, add to an already vulnerable environ­
ment. The vast majority of housing stock is of poor quality and the 
increasing demand for housing among a growing low-income segment of the
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population intensifies the potential scale of a disaster. Ironically, a 
society in transition from a traditional base of self-reliance, both in 
food production and in providing shelter using indigenous materials and 
traditional skills, often suffers from increased vulnerability to disas­
ters. While traditional housing, for example, evolved over time in 
response to both human and environmental needs, new styles using modern or 
mixed materials generally suffer in quality as construction skills have 
not kept up with the new inputs in materials and configurations. In agri­
culture, efforts to raise more marketable crops may lead to a decrease in 
crop diversity, changes in cropping patterns or reliance on new less 
disaster-resistant varieties, making this sector more vulnerable to damage 
and loss, and sometimes resulting in a need for emergency food aid not 
formerly required.
A graphic example of the value of traditional self-reliance in Pacific 
societies was evident in the aftermath of the 1986 cyclone Namu that 
destroyed an estimated 80% of the housing on the island of Malaita in the 
Solomon Islands. Malaita remains predominantly a traditional agricultural 
and fishing culture, although elements of recent developmental trends such 
as fiberglass fishing boats, gasoline engines and small shops are increas­
ing. Housing is constructed essentially of traditional materials: palm 
leaves for roofs and walls and local saplings for framing. Some modifi­
cations in construction techniques, such as nailing joints rather than 
lashing them, are in widespread use. Asked to conduct a damage assessment 
by the AID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, INTERTECT observed 
that, two months after the date of the cyclone, nearly 80-90% of all of 
the housing had been reconstructed. Village chiefs had organized recon­
struction efforts among families without outside assistance. Traditional 
materials were used as before.
The strength of local cultural networks and the use of traditional 
materials and skills greatly reduced the need for intervention or assis­
tance on Malaita. Yet in areas where people have begun to use imported 
materials which are costly to construct, what seems to be a "better" house 
may in fact be less resistant to natural hazards because of poor workman­
ship and detailing, and the cost in terms of both money and time to repair 
or replace the house is much greater.
Rapid restoration of normal economic systems within a community in the 
wake of disaster is essential to its long-term recovery. Markets and 
shops damaged or destroyed in a disaster mean a loss of livelihood to the 
owner and employees, and a loss of supplies within the community, until 
such time as they can be reopened and resume normal business. Assistance 
programs that find ways to support local economic recovery efforts are 
particularly important as the benefits spread from employer to employee, 
from local enterprise to national suppliers, etc., and the income gener­
ated achieves a multiplier effect, contributing in many ways to overall 
community recovery.
In addition, established economic systems must compete with relief 
systems if normal networks are bypassed. For example, shop owners and 
suppliers providing essential goods to communities can lose much needed 
income if long-term food or construction materials distribution programs 
force them to sell at reduced prices in order to compete with disaster 
assistance programs. This sort of competition is not uncommon either with
31
regard to local labor and professionals. Often carpenters and masons who 
are essential to the normal building processes in communities are left out 
of the reconstruction process. The assistance provided often inadvertent­
ly bypasses the opportunity to stabilize and support the very important 
micro-economies" which in turn help people help themselves. While emer­
gency responses must quickly meet fundamental human needs for survival, 
post-emergency responses must also address the essential economic aspects 
of recovery.
The impact of relief programs on developing countries can have many 
hidden dimensions, depending on the magnitude of a disaster and the 
methods of intervention. Given the already limited resources and fragile 
economies of the vast majority of Pacific countries, a disaster can 
significantly delay or set back ongoing development efforts by diverting 
financial support, human and material resources to respond to both imme­
diate recovery needs and long-term reconstruction efforts which compete 
with normal development programs. On the other hand, the assistance 
programs offered by outside agencies can create long-lasting problems for 
developing countries, so that humanitarian aid becomes both help and 
hindrance.
The keys to implementing appropriate responses are: 1) to establish in 
which phase of post-disaster recovery the programs will be implemented; 
and 2) to determine what methods of intervention are the most appropriate 
to support local recovery efforts. It is important to match program 
priorities with local priorities and then structure a program that will be 
effective in the local context.
INTERTECT’s involvement in planning, implementing and evaluating 
disaster response programs in developing countries has provided some 
insight into the effectiveness of many different relief efforts. The 
underlying lesson we have learned is the importance of recognizing that 
disasters are more than just isolated events that require immediate 
relief. Disasters often expose or exacerbate the most pressing develop­
mental issues facing a society. The vulnerability of the poor is brought 
into graphic focus and the attendant issues of recovery are far more 
complex than simply rebuilding or repairing damage. Overcrowding, lack of 
basic services, unemployment, unsafe housing, land tenure issues and lack 
of resources are all common aspects to be considered in the provision of 
aid. There is no uniform response that can address the specific circum­
stances that regional program managers encounter each time.
This is not to suggest that FEMA bear the brunt of upgrading develop­
ment standards throughout the Pacific. The importance of recognizing the 
context is to provide a framework for structuring appropriate responses 
for both food and housing assistance. Post-disaster intervention is more 
effective if operations reinforce development goals and efforts rather 
than ignore them. Responses involving mitigation, aided self-help, local 
participation and skills improvement can provide a basis for positive and 
effective involvement.
The imposition of external decision-making and priorities with regard 
to program content and approach often seems at first glance to be the most 
efficient and speediest approach to relief, and certainly has been the 
operating principle for many assisting agencies down through the years.
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But examples abound in the international relief system of good intentions 
and speedy delivery that have resulted in unacceptable, inappropriate or 
unneeded aid. Knowledge of the region and pre-disaster planning are vital 
to ensuring that the time, money and manpower expended in humanitarian 
assistance are invested wisely and truly of help to the intended benefi­
ciaries. Not only will they provide a better foundation for decision­
making; they also will result in speeding up the process and in achieving 
more value for the investment.
In developing an overall approach, questions must be asked about the 
relative merits and assumptions of alternative assistance methods, such 
as:
1. What future expectations do we create with our methods and kinds of 
assistance?
2. Does an approach convey a "paternalistic" attitude toward local 
governments and communities or disaster victims?
3. Does the relief system provide appropriate aid at the appropriate time 
to meet people’s needs?
4. Are the approaches and programs an implementation of the agency’s 
priorities or the victims’ priorities?
5. Does the assistance planned take full advantage of local resources and 
manpower, or does it bypass local institutional capabilities?
B. Establishing Policy for FEMA Housing/Food Assistance Programs
The thrust of this survey effort is to provide a catalyst for shaping 
program policy in the Pacific region. The policy should function as a 
framework for developing specific response strategies and methods. While 
options are discussed in this report, its primary focus is on defining a 
comprehensive process for program development and decision-making.
What emerges from the interviews with FEMA management and staff and 
from the brief regional survey is a gap in the program concept that has 
not been fully addressed: that is, the difference between providing 
relatively standardized assistance in the United States, and providing 
that same assistance in a region of less developed countries.
It appears to us that the implementation of successful programs in the 
western Pacific is tied to the development and integration of four funda­
mental programming elements:
--  policy goals and objectives;
pre-disaster planning;
--- training;
--- program assessment and evaluation.
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While the standard mechanisms for implementing programs within the 
U.S. are somewhat explicit in the mandate —  e.g., the use of existing 
rental housing or the provision of mobile homes —  their direct applica­
tion in the western Pacific is in many ways inappropriate. A void is 
created when more specific systems for developing and evaluating response 
strategies is not established.
As a practicality, FEMA must define the basic framework to guide 
regional program development. Until this occurs, there is no consistent 
vehicle for evaluating the effectiveness of a particular response. The 
collective experience of regional program managers should guide the pro­
cess of developing appropriate response strategies.
1* Setting Policy Goals and Objectives. Although the notion of esta­
blishing effective policy goals and objectives seems straight-forward, 
the variations in developmental context among the Pacific territories 
require in-depth investigation and careful planning.
Taken as a whole, it is not clear now what the goals or objectives are 
for programs conducted in the Pacific region. The disparity of 
perception within the agency of what temporary housing assistance 
ought to be makes it difficult to structure a response strategy or to 
employ appropriate methods of intervention that can then be evaluated 
in a consistent way.
Different programs have utilized very different approach concepts; for 
instance, the Minimal Repair program is a direct grant to people who 
must coordinate and implement their own repairs, while Temporary 
Housing programs most often do not invest this responsibility with the 
victims.
Hazard mitigation is sometimes integrated into Temporary Housing 
Assistance programs and sometimes not. There were no cases surveyed, 
where active mitigation was incorporated as part of the Minimal Repair 
program, yet this program represents the greatest proportion of hous­
ing assistance expenditures and number of victims assisted.
What was most apparent during the regional survey is the substantial 
effort on the part of program managers to deliver responses appro­
priate to specific needs. The available resources, social and 
cultural characteristics, and developmental constraints or opportuni­
ties vary greatly among the individual territories as well as within 
an island archipelago. But what appears straight-forward as a manage­
ment concept and delivery process on paper can easily evaporate in the 
field given local conditions. Each response must work not only within 
the cultural and developmental contexts but also within the political 
context. These political and societal aspects are intrinsically 
interwoven in the relatively small and isolated Pacific territories, 
and this fact plays an extremely important role in the effectiveness 
of program operations.
As FEMA has witnessed in the past, disaster intervention can have, and 
usually does have, a significant impact on local politics as well as 
local communities and community leaders. To design or operate a pro­
gram without prior planning and community involvement can potentially 
have very disruptive ramifications.
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Particularly in developing countries, disasters expose the basic 
inadequacies and problems within a society. The government and local 
village leaders, if not perceived as capable or equitable in relief 
efforts, often become embroiled in political turmoil as recovery 
efforts are in progress. This is often the case when large highly- 
visible contracts are awarded to political allies and for one reason 
or another perceived mismanagement or slow delivery performance 
becomes a central issue, debated in the local (and sometimes world) 
press.
These situations can be very explosive and must be carefully struc­
tured and monitored in order to avoid as much as possible criticisms 
of slow response, favoritism, inequity of aid, etc. It is essential 
that program operations have adequate monitoring mechanisms and that 
responsibility for decision-making reside at the operations level 
where the immediate data required for informed decisions is located. 
Effective field operations depend on a good decision-making dialogue 
between the agency and local governments and communities. This can 
only be done by the field operations staff and management working 
within an overall policy framework.
In our experience, the most effective method of setting policy goals 
and objectives is to implement a comprehensive pre-disaster planning 
process for each country in which the agency will be expected to 
coordinate relief efforts. Development of comprehensive pre-disaster 
plans provides specific guidance for field operations and decision­
making. Establishment of program policies is part of a dialogue 
within the pre-disaster planning process. Policies should have a 
thorough and comprehensive data base that provides essential informa­
tion to agency administration, program managers and field operations 
staff who may be working in a particular state for the first time.
This base of information is referred to in this report as a COUNTRY 
PROFILE. These profiles form a base for developing and implementing 
response strategies and appropriate methods of intervention for food, 
shelter, individual and public assistance.
Policy goals are most effective if they define the overall concepts 
and objectives while providing flexibility in the approach strategies 
that may be employed on a case-by-case basis. Different types, 
magnitudes and locations of disaster events will require somewhat 
different approaches, depending on local conditions. For example, 
urban housing assistance usually requires much more consolidated 
approach strategies, utilizing existing urban resources, infrastruc­
ture and systems. Disasters in rural areas or outer islands away from 
resources will require an altogether different intervention strategy.
Therefore the fundamental aspects of assistance objectives must be 
clearly defined. Appropriate questions regarding the overall goal of 
aid for FEMA to explore at this point might be:
--- Is the intervention intended to help people until they can
recover on their own? or
--  Is the intervention intended to help people to recover or to
speed the process of recovery?
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2. Recovery Phases and Inputs. Each goal has distinctly different impli­
cations for program development and relates to different phases of 
recovery. These phases —  emergency, transitional and reconstruction 
—  overlap and should never be used to set time limits on recovery 
activities; but they can be used to delineate the kinds of activities 
occurring in a community in the aftermath of a disaster. It is impor­
tant that program assistance relate to the typical activities of a 
particular phase. Fred Cuny describes these phases as follows:
"The emergency phase is characterized by actions that are 
necessary to save lives. They include search and rescue, 
first aid, emergency medical assistance, restoration of emer­
gency communication and transportation networks, and in some 
cases, evacuation from areas still vulnerable to further dis­
aster. Other actions taken during the emergency phase in­
clude initial disaster assessment and emergency repairs to 
critical facilities.
"The transitional phase initially includes people’s returning 
to work and the permanent repair of infrastructure, repair of 
damaged buildings, and other actions necessary to help the 
community return to normal as quickly as possible. This 
phase coincides with the period in which emotional recovery 
normally occurs. In many ways, the recovery period is the 
most difficult for the victims. During this time, depression 
may set in as people finally realize the full extent of loss­
es. Limited outside intervention during this phase can be of 
great assistance in helping victims to recover. Assistance 
in the form of cash or credit, activities that produce jobs, 
and constructive projects are among the more appropriate 
types of aid.
"Reconstruction is characterized by the physical reordering 
of the community and the physical environment. During this 
period, people reconstruct housing and other buildings, and 
repair roads and other community facilities; agriculture re­
turns to normal. The time span is often very difficult to 
define. It may start fairly early, even during the recovery 
period, and may last for many years. The reconstruction of 
housing in particular is an activity that takes many years to 
complete.
"It is difficult to set time limits on these three phases or 
accurately to define the limits of each, even for one speci­
fic type of disaster. For example, the emergency phase of a 
hurricane or a flood may be only a few days, or as long as a 
week." [Cuny, Disasters and Development. Oxford Univ. Press,
1983]
The first strategy —  to help victims until they recover —  is geared 
to providing for immediate needs and in practice generally has little 
impact on reducing the overall recovery time. Typical program opera­
tions focus on the immediate acquisition and distribution of food, 
clothing, essential household items, medical aid, and tents or plastic 
sheeting. These operations are usually conducted as a short-term 
response in the emergency phase, where "recovery" implies survival.
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The second strategy —  helping people to recover —  takes place in 
either the transitional or reconstruction phase. The objectives are 
far broader, aimed at providing the resources required to meet longer- 
term recovery objectives. Well-planned assistance here can in fact 
reduce overall recovery time. Operational assistance normally 
involves the provision of materials and/or tools needed in the recon­
struction phase, cash or credit, as well as work opportunities which 
allow people to earn income that in turn helps them achieve their 
recovery needs.
A third strategy, similar to the preceding one, includes assistance in 
all three phases —  emergency, transitional and reconstruction —  with 
programs planned to mesh and expand in a "building block" approach. 
Operations focus on the restoration of physical and institutional 
infrastructure within communities, providing the required resources to 
support local efforts and create opportunities for victims. Typical 
programs offer stimulation to the normal economic systems such as 
setting up work projects for local disaster-affected residents that 
can provide them with cash or in-kind resources to accomplish indivi­
dual reconstruction objectives. Early housing assistance might be in 
the form of basic building materials (e.g., roofing sheets, poles, 
etc.) that can first be used in erecting temporary shelters, then 
later reused in construction of permanent housing.
The breadth of the agency’s mandate and our observations in the field 
indicate that FEMA operations can involve all these aspects in varying 
degrees. The objective then is to structure policy and programs that 
recognize the context of program operations and maximize the positive 
impacts of assistance in a comprehensive and integrated way.
INTERTECT’s experience in coordinating and implementing relief pro­
grams in developing countries has taught us that the most effective relief 
programs are firmly grounded in developmental concepts and share the 
following characteristics:
--  Program activities are structured to support local institutions
and networks that are involved in the ongoing provision of 
services to meet normal local needs.
--- Programs work to reinforce locally-defined developmental goals.
--- Programs support and strengthen local institutional (social,
economic, religious, political) capabilities where appropriate.
--  Programs provide culturally-acceptable aid in a culturally-
acceptable manner.
--- Programs reflect the priorities of victims.
--- The decision-making process involves local participation in a
real way (including national governments, local governments, 
community leaders, etc.).
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--  Program operations are structured on a base of information that
accurately defines local conditions and resources which influence 
program delivery.
--  Programs prioritize areas of operations.
C. Comprehensive Program Planning
In order to develop workable guidelines and program options to improve 
the effectiveness of the assistance offered, two basic activities should 
be undertaken to compile the necessary information on which to base sound 
judgements specifically relevant to the region: the preparation of country 
profiles, and the development of disaster preparedness plans.
1* Country Profiles. As an initial activity in the overall planning
process, we recommend that FEMA produce a comprehensive data base for 
the Pacific territories. These are referred to here as COUNTRY 
PROFILES for each state or territory. The profiles will serve as the 
primary resource of essential background information for program 
managers, agency administrators and field operations staff. They 
should be updated on a regular basis so that the information remains 
current and useful. The profiles will serve as a "collective memory" 
resource for the agency and provide baseline data for revising 
response strategies and developing appropriate programs for the provi­
sion of food, shelter, individual and public facilities assistance.
Country profiles should contain in-depth information in the following 
categories:
a. Locational/Geographic/Demographic Data:
1) regional mapping
2) detailed USGS mapping
3) climate/soils/water resources
4) physical description
5) natural resources
6) hazard risks including hazard mapping and risk mapping
7) population profile including distribution and household size
Socio-cultural Data:
1) historical background
2) languages
3) literacy characteristics
4) religious influences
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5) political structure/influence
6) family structure, characteristics
7) dietary characteristics including how food is procured,
e.g., family crops, trading, purchase on local markets, 
import, etc.
8) employment characteristics including sector profiles of 
number of people employed, distribution of labor force, 
average wages, income, seasonal characteristics, character­
istics of subsistence economies, potential impacts of 
hazards (vulnerability analysis) and recovery needs
9) land ownership patterns
c . Developmental Context:
1) government structure: state and local
2) government agency capabilities and involvement
3) infrastructure capacity including documentation of roads, 
water, sewer, electricity, etc., with vulnerability analysis 
and projected recovery needs
4) identification of regulatory agencies: capabilities, 
programs, current impact
5) ongoing development programs by sector (scope, budget and 
financial resources, current status, etc.)
6) private sector resources: capabilities and areas of
involvement
7) logistics support, including vulnerability analysis and 
projected recovery needs for
--  transport systems: resources/capabilities/schedules
--- communications: existing networks, resources and backup
support
--- extended regional transportation and communication
resources
--- housing, communications and transportation resources
for disaster response staff
d. Agricultural Vulnerability Analysis:
1) market and subsistence crop types/locations
2) crop cycles
3) markets
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4) distribution
5) agricultural risk/vulnerability mapping
6) projected recovery needs
7) institutional support (public/private; nature of assistance, 
areas of operations, capabilities)
8) normal food distribution networks
9) transportation methods/logistics
10) hazard impact on normal food procurement systems
e. Housing/Settlement Vulnerability Analysis:
1) local construction processes (urban/rural) including:
--  common building styles and materials
--  typical sites and configurations
--  special cultural adaptations
--  use characteristics
--  transitional trends in materials or styles
--  building methods (self, communal, local craftsmen,
off-island labor, etc.)
--- acquisition of materials (urban; rural; local
suppliers; traditional natural resources; housing 
programs; import; etc.)
--- normal period of construction and characteristics of
construction process
--- cost of materials/affordability
--- average total construction cost per house type
--- transportation of materials
--- special considerations regarding material use (i.e.,
susceptibility to termites, curing time, reaction to 
airborne salts, etc.)
--- level of building skills available
--  financing methods
--- institutional support (tradesmen training, government
or private housing programs, financing resources, etc.)
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2) identification of vulnerability to specific hazards:
--  cultural adaptations to risk
--  construction techniques/details used that increase
structural vulnerability
--  siting/locational practices that increase vulnerability
--  current housing deficit (public/private; rental)
--  extent of insurance coverage
--  critical structures at risk (government services;
water, sewer, power facilities; schools; etc.)
3) local and regional institutional response potential
f . Special Problems:
List type and location for any hazardous waste sites, structures 
that house toxic chemicals or nuclear material, where damage 
might result in contamination or pollution of water, soil, air, 
food stocks, etc.
g. Insular Resources:
1) technical assistance (personnel and information resources)
--  housing
--  agriculture
--  food distribution
2) materials/supplies (including any regional stockpiles)
3) transportation/logistics support
4) training (personnel and information resources)
h. Past Experience:
1) disaster history
2) description of past relief programs
3) local participation
4) regional participation
5) lessons learned (constraints/opportunities)
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Preparedness Plans. Once the base information is compiled, the second 
phase of pre-disaster planning should focus on comprehensive response 
strategies and alternative methodologies for implementation in each of 
the specific territories to which FEMA responds in a disaster situa­
tion. Each PREPAREDNESS PLAN will utilize the data generated in the 
COUNTRY PROFILE to develop detailed response concepts.
There are six basic components to a preparedness plan:
a. Determination of the objectives to be met in each affected sector 
(housing, agriculture, public facilities, individual assistance).
b. Identification of alternative strategies to accomplish the stated 
objectives.
c. Delineation of comprehensive response methodologies to include:
1) sequence of activities;
2) participants: roles, responsibilities;
3) administrative process;
4) resources required.
d. Development of tools and structure to implement plan, including:
1) communication networks;
2) transport capabilities;
3) action plans;
4) procedures;
5) assessment methodologies/standardized reporting;
6) checklists;
7) monitoring system.
e. Identification of strategic resources:
1) critical resources required to meet response objectives, and 
alternatives;
2) location;
3) methods of procurement;
4) mobilization (pre-disaster agreements/contracts to ensure 
availability, transport).
f. Organization for specific program components:
local institutional support (capabilities; division of 
responsibility, etc.);
possible additional service needs;
training: intra-agency; inter-agency; local counterparts; 
contractors;
program development.
The outline above can be illustrated in a very simplified manner as 
follows: Under (a) the decision is made to assist local efforts in hous­
ing repair and reconstruction. Under (b) the options might be to provide 
technical assistance to local builders/contractors; to provide basic 
materials and tools for construction; to provide standard grants to indi­
viduals to use as they choose; to provide loans tied to housing investment 
only; to subsidize construction materials costs to keep them affordable; 
etc. One option chosen is to provide technical assistance, so under (c) 
the personnel/resources needed and sequence of activities are developed, 
and roles/responsibilities are clearly delineated. Then under (d) the 
necessary system to conduct, monitor and evaluate the program is designed 
and checked against known capabilities/availabilities to ensure that it 
can be accomplished as planned within the fiscal and p>olicy constraints of 
the agency, and without overwhelming the capacities of the local institu­
tions involved. Under (e) the availability of the personnel and basic 
materials is ensured, along with any new construction components that 
might need to be acquired and specific technical information such as 
booklets/manuals on critical strengthening details for local types of 
construction. Finally, under (f) any details and pre-agreements that can 
be made in preparation for such a program are worked out in advance to 
facilitate collaboration, avoid overlap with other programs, and convey a 
full understanding of how the program will work to all the participants: 
agency headquarters, program staff, local government officials, and any 
other agencies or local assisting groups. If regional program managers 
and appropriate local officials have participated in the process from the 
beginning, and if local priorities and custom are meshed with agency 
objectives, then the agency is prepared to initiate and carry out the 
program in the event of a disaster, with every expectation of avoiding 
problems, meeting the needs of the people, and achieving its objective.
Good preparedness planning is simply a means of removing program 
response decisions from the disaster period —  when damage and needs 
assessments are incomplete, information and advice may be conflicting, the 
pressure for speed is compelling, etc. —  into the pre-disaster period 
when the objectives, options, potential for collaboration and impact can 
be analyzed more thoroughly. While FEMA is well-versed in the art of 
planning, the need here is for more country- or island-specific plans that 
will help regional program managers interact with local officials and 
select effective assistance options.
1 )
2)
3)
4)
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IV. THE ROLE OF MITIGATION
The fundamental objective of mitigation is to reduce the loss of life 
and property caused by natural hazards. In the U.S., mitigation is 
largely legislated through building code regulations, land use planning 
and zoning. As discussed earlier, the impact of these kinds of insti­
tutional mechanisms will not be a significant factor in reducing 
vulnerability for most of the western Pacific region within the foresee­
able future. For mitigation to be successful, direct and active methods 
must be employed.
It appears that the incorporation of mitigation concepts into FEMA’s 
assistance programs is particularly relevant for the Pacific region. The 
frequency of disasters is well—documented. Reduction of vulnerability 
seems to be in the best interest of both FEMA and island populations.
In many of the islands surveyed, it was evident that mitigation 
concepts were sometimes w'ell-integrated into response strategies. Re­
placement housing units often incorporated wind-resistant engineering 
techniques that help to reduce vulnerability.
The best opportunity for significant progress in mitigation is often 
in the aftermath of a disaster. Public awareness of vulnerability is 
heightened and receptivity to changes in traditional methods or techniques 
may be very strong.
For mitigation to be effective, the information, techniques, materials 
and necessary skills must gain acceptance among local people. Use of 
methods and materials that are not transferrable to normal practices 
within a particular sector has very little impact on local practices. 
Common mistakes are use of expensive or imported materials not available 
through normal local networks, lack of training for local people normally 
involved in the provision of materials or skills, and attempting to use 
culturally-unacceptable concepts and designs. The objective is not to 
place the burden for protection with FEMA but rather to transfer the 
skills and knowledge to the local construction people —  whether they be 
contractors or self-builders —  so that protection becomes a part of the 
normal, ongoing construction process in the community.
Mitigation strategies must be incorporated early in the planning 
phases. The strategies should be tested and evaluated for effectiveness 
and appropriateness of approach. The scope of vulnerability for a 
particular sector must be thoroughly documented in the Country Profile if 
appropriate responses are to be developed. For example, the Temporary 
Housing Assistance Program in the Manu’a Islands of American Samoa after 
Cyclone Tusi provides an interesting look at mitigation concepts. The 
affected housing was located in small settlements along narrow coastal 
strips just above sea level. The topography of the Manu’a Islands is 
composed of nearly-vertical terrain that is largely unsuitable for settle­
ments; small coastal flats create opportunities for housing sites. Hazard 
vulnerability here has several dimensions: susceptibility to earthquakes,
cyclones, landslides and storm surges.
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Mitigation techniques that address both earthquake and wind resistance 
issues were incorporated in the replacement units. Reinforced concrete 
bathroom modules connected to the houses were designed to serve as storm 
shelters. The dilemma here is that the likelihood of significant storm 
surge is probably as great as that of strong wind forces. Encouraging 
people to seek refuge in structures that are inherently vulnerable because 
of location in a storm surge zone is potentially very dangerous. Equally, 
many housing sites are highly vulnerable to destruction by landslides from 
the steep terrain and cliffs just behind them. In cases such as these, 
appropriate mitigation measures do not lie totally within the scope of 
structural design. Non-structural measures such as alternative housing 
sites, designated places of more protective refuge, and emphasis on 
reliable early warning techniques and evacuation strategies are more 
appropriate as effective protection and preparedness strategies.
FEMA may also be able to help local governments focus on efforts to 
reduce vulnerability to the economic and agricultural sectors by encour­
aging diversification, relocating job-producing resources, or supporting 
appropriate agricultural techniques such as crop diversification, dif­
ferent planting methods or insurance programs.
Vulnerability reduction strategies should be defined within the 
context of normal developmental and cultural circumstances. Implemen­
tation of long-term efforts must involve the political and social 
structure. Without program initiation or support from local institutions, 
mitigation activities will have little chance of success.
V. OBSERVATIONS ON APPROPRIATE HOUSING INTERVENTION 
POLICIES/STRATEGIES/METHODS
Appropriate housing intervention strategies are linked to the policy 
goals and objectives as discussed in Section III of this report. The 
regional survey provides a glimpse of the political, developmental and 
environmental contexts within which programs must operate. It is, in a 
way, a "snapshot" of what is in reality a long and involved process.
INTERTECT has a broad background of experience in designing, coordina­
ting and implementing disaster response efforts in developing countries 
that share many similar characteristics with the countries surveyed. We 
cannot, however, superimpose our experience onto the FEMA programs as a 
recommendation for restructuring existing program activities. Agency 
priorities must be established and evaluated according to site-specific 
information on the region and each country.
What seems appropriate as a product of the brief regional survey is an 
examination of the opportunities and constraints involved in optional 
program strategies. Some response techniques or methods discussed may not 
fit' exactly within past standards, methods of operation or agency 
regulations and procedures. The challenge, as we see it, is to first 
identify sensible and effective response strategies that can meet realis­
tic goals and objectives.
This may require modification of existing regulations and practices, 
or it may indicate a need to restructure the methods of intervention 
within the framework of the existing mandate.
As stated before, it is more effective to start with the context of 
local needs and design strategies based on those needs, rather than 
beginning with the context of regulations and procedures for meeting U.S. 
post-disaster needs.
In our experience, one of the most important elements of providing 
appropriate assistance in the housing sector is recognition of the 
priorities of victims. The concept of temporary housing, as it applies to 
U.S. assistance, is very clear. Assistance is provided to house families 
until they are able to secure more permanent housing through available 
resources. As mentioned earlier, the strategy of providing short-term 
rental subsidies for families to relocate in available rental housing is 
based on an existing resource network. The provision of mobile homes, 
where no rental housing is available, also is an explicit strategy based 
on an assumed resource network. The context of U.S. housing availability 
and acquisition generated the basic strategy for temporary housing 
assistance.
Its application in the South Pacific region is complicated by many 
factors. In some disaster situations, the first priority of the victims 
is recovery of their means of income; this may mean restarting small 
businesses so that employment is not lost, or salvaging their crops and 
investing in new seeds or tubers for replanting, etc. Housing for these 
people often holds a much lower priority than income-generation, and the
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assistance they need most is in this sector rather than in housing. U.S. 
assistance is defined by what we believe is a high priority for the 
majority of the U.S. population.
The most obvious complicating factor is the absence of the basic 
networks. As regional program managers working in the Pacific have exper­
ienced, the notion of "temporary" housing has limited application, and 
whatever is provided normally becomes permanent housing. For the most 
part, there are no existing resources of rental housing or comparable 
units to mobile homes. The collective response strategies of FEMA all 
recognize this fact and replacement units are designed and built accor­
dingly.
There is, however, ongoing debate within FEMA about the appropriate­
ness of providing what amounts to permanent housing units constructed of 
concrete on concrete block, which seem on the surface less defensible as 
temporary housing units than houses constructed of wood. The reality of 
use is the same; the dilemma is really linked to the inappropriate termi­
nology on one hand and the unresolved policy decision on the other. This 
unresolved issue impedes progress in developing more effective responses 
to victims} needs.
Another dilemma that recurs in many of the housing program efforts is 
the expectation of the completion of programs within a certain timeframe, 
and the consistent failure of activities to meet this goal. There is no 
one reason why this disparity exists. Both the expectations and the 
response strategies must be examined in relation to the context of the 
disaster and the objectives of the agency.
Past experience has shown us that there are some common elements that 
influence program success. Failure to examine relief response within the 
broader developmental context of a country often leads to methods and 
approaches that either exceed the capabilities of local resources or are 
inconsistent with the priorities and normal practices of the disaster- 
stricken community. Past relief programs should serve as a resource for 
evaluating the real impact against initial objectives and developing new 
approaches.
In American Samoa, for example, it is instructive to examine the 
program response in the aftermath of Cyclone Tusi from the developmental 
perspective. Damage to housing occurred both on the main island of 
Tutuila and in the Manu’a islands of Tau, Ofu and Olosega.
The normal housing process in Samoa is much like that of other terri­
tories in the Pacific. Homeowners usually build incrementally over a 
long period of time. Skilled labor is sometimes hired or informal 
arrangements are made in many cases to use skilled labor from within the 
family network. Western Samoans provide much of the skilled labor for 
American Samoa, and the extended family network also includes relatives 
from Western Samoa.
Banks are rarely involved in financing housing construction. Until 
the past year, no mortgage loans existed. Loans are in the form of 
unsecured personal loans for limited amounts. The vast majority of con­
struction is not financed unless resources are pooled within a family.
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In structuring a housing assistance response, the FEMA program devel­
oped a standard replacement housing design: a poured-in-place concrete 
structure with heavy timber roof framing using specially-designed heavy- 
gauge metal brackets and gusset plates. Program management responsibili­
ties were vested in the Public Works Department in Tutuila, clearly the 
agency with the most resources and technical capabilities. Contracts for 
constructing the housing units were bid in packages that combined a number 
of units and were awarded to several different contractors. The value of 
contracts ranged up to $500,000. Bonding is required by FEMA for all 
contracts over $100,000; this was a problem for many contractors, so an 
alternative method of retaining 20% of the total contract amount was 
instituted. The total number of houses to be constructed under the 
program was 161.
The primary issues that arose during program implementation were 
related to the slowness of contractor performance and the inability of 
some contractors to perform the work or to coordinate construction acti­
vities. The Public Works Department was forced to terminate several 
contracts and assume responsibility for completing construction. Com­
pounding this situation was the confusion over responsibility for managing 
and monitoring the procurement and delivery of materials to the Manu’a 
Islands. In addition, transportation of materials was limited to only one 
government ship that was also required to service the normal material 
supply needs of the outer islands. Unfavorable weather conditions 
frequently prevented scheduled deliveries of materials into the Tau 
harbor.
Looking at it from a developmental perspective, several elements stand 
out as influences on the effectiveness of the program. The structure of 
the contracting component of the program exceeded the capabilities of 
local contractors. Several contractors did not have the experience 
required to manage the scale of the project contract effectively. Nego­
tiations with banks and material suppliers, transportation logistics and 
mobilization were factors that simply overwhelmed contractors. Some 
contractors were also responsible for reconstructing public facilities and 
this also diverted resources and management focus away from the housing 
contracts.
This is not unusual or unique to the Pacific region. The most compe­
tent contractors in comparable island countries are depended on for major 
public and institutional projects. Doubling up to take on additional work 
is often the undoing of many contracting operations. The relative inex­
perience in managing large contracts, particularly with respect to the 
financing experience, was a critical factor in non-performance and the 
eventual termination of several contract packages.
The Public Works Department found itself in the position of inter­
vening in issues involving contractor payments to material suppliers.
This led to further confusion and a breakdown in discrete responsibilities 
for organizing delivery and distribution of materials to project sites.
Given the scale of the project implementation process, with consoli­
dated contracts to several of the larger contracting firms, relationships 
between the contracting firms and political leaders became a major factor 
in trying to resolve implementation issues. These were highly-visible
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projects that influence both public perception and political agendas. In 
this case, it became necessary to develop a specialized structure to 
implement relief efforts, which replaced the normal housing processes. 
Public Works resources and personnel were forced to integrate responsi­
bility for program implementation with their ongoing responsibilities as 
well as responsibility for overseeing reconstruction of public facilities.
While there may be many layers in the implementation process that can 
be singled out as problem areas, what remains as a fundamental factor is 
that initial program expectations exceeded local capabilities.
In contrast, housing assistance in Truk after Typhoon Nina adopted a 
much different structure. Rather than approaching response as a responsi­
bility to create a centrally-administered, product-oriented program, FEMA 
elected to provide grants to families in lieu of constructed units. There 
were no requirements for a standard of construction, materials use, size 
or method of contracting. Homeowners were given responsibility for 
organizing construction of their own units and deciding what type and size 
of house would meet their needs. During our field survey we visited 
several houses in the process of construction.
In the context of normal developmental goals, this concept embodies 
many of the principles that we have identified as important to the success 
of a program. Responsibility was vested with the victims who are normally 
in charge of the housing process. They utilized traditional networks for 
labor and materials procurement and transportation, which in turn contri­
buted to the stability of local economies. The design of the house was 
culturally acceptable and the administrative costs for the relief program 
were minimal. Equally important is that the program was conducted under 
the provisions of the FEMA mandate.
What are the drawbacks with this approach if it in fact meets so many 
of the criteria for an appropriate program response? What appears to be 
at issue within FEMA is the use of grant money and the apparent long time 
period for reconstruction.
The housing reconstruction process in Truk reflects in many ways the 
normal process of housing throughout the Pacific. The idea that replace­
ment housing is an immediate need that should be provided as quickly as 
possible is not necessarily shared by the victims. As we have seen, many 
people are able to construct temporary shelter using salvaged materials in 
the aftermath of a cyclone, and many are able to obtain short-term housing 
within their extended families. Given the opportunity to rebuild, people 
will attempt to meet their needs by erecting a simple structure of suffi­
cient size using affordable materials and methods. The priority of con­
structing a house quickly does not always transfer to the victim as a 
result of the disaster. In many cases, people use assistance resources 
combined with family savings to build what they feel is suitable. This 
may mean waiting until a crop is harvested, enough income is saved or 
labor resources are available to begin construction. Many families will 
"make do" in marginal shelters of salvaged materials to take full advan­
tage of assistance contributions. The need is no less real; however, the 
perception of priority may be different.
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A relevant question then may be: What are the expectations of the
assisting agencies? And equally: What sort of accountability for program
assistance is required? The expectations and objectives must be balanced 
with the delivery mechanisms of any program. If the agency requires a 
guarantee" that assistance be utilized within a pre-determined time 
period and that the product meet minimum standards established by the 
agency, then clearly suitable response strategies must be developed to 
achieve these goals.
The housing assistance program in Rota provides another insight into 
expectations and appropriate strategies. The original concept of the 
program was to contract for the construction of wooden housing units 
designed in the U.S. for FEMA. The units were designed to withstand 
substantial wind forces. Local residents requested the opportunity to 
build more culturally—acceptable houses using the same amount of money the 
program had committed to funding the construction of the wooden houses. 
This request was granted and FEMA established a program structure that 
utilized savings accounts in a local bank. Funds for housing units were 
deposited in the accounts and withdrawals for construction required the 
signature of the owner, contractor and FEMA inspecting agent. Smaller 
houses built with reinforced concrete block walls and flat reinforced 
concrete roofs were constructed based on a standard plan.
While construction periods varied, most houses were completed at the 
time of our survey and FEMA maintained quality control via its inspecting 
agent.
While the notion of housing units built of concrete and concrete block 
does not fit easily into a definition of temporary housing, the program 
seems to demonstrate a significant response to victims’ needs and 
priorities.
Unlike the Truk effort, the program was administered in the construc­
tion phase, requiring a long-term project commitment. The opportunity was 
created to monitor both the quality of the ultimate product and the 
accountability for individual expenditures using local administration. In 
this case, FEMA provided a qualified on-site inspector for the program. 
Individual homeowners negotiated privately with local contractors or 
skilled tradesmen to perform the work.
The program capitalized on local resources, involved local people in 
the decision-making process, and worked within the normal housing pro­
cess. The program seems to have achieved a balance between the agency’s 
need for accountability and local control.
An important element here, which was achieved in a different way in 
American Samoa, is the integration of mitigation techniques in the 
reconstruction process. The replacement housing now constitutes a much 
more hazard-resistant stock than the pre-cyclone housing, using locally- 
available materials, techniques and labor.
Matching goals and objectives with response methods should be a 
natural outgrowth of the collective agency experience. A balanced stra­
tegy should capitalize on local capabilities and direct assistance through 
the normal channels of the housing construction process as much as is
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feasible. Approaches may differ for specific sectors within a society, 
e.g., rural or urban population, low- vs. high-income, etc. Urban areas 
may require a more coordinated process that relies less on self-help and 
more on coordinated construction teams; assistance to rural areas may be 
more effective if the local people are given more control over the 
building process. While many different approaches can be used on a case- 
by-case basis, we would encourage agencies involved in post-disaster 
housing assistance to supply aid in a way that will support and ultimately 
strengthen local coping abilities. This approach consistently contributes 
more to long-term recovery efforts, and to local ability to respond to 
future disaster events, than programs which emphasize the relatively quick 
provision of shelter as an isolated event.
When housing assistance operations are focused only on provision of a 
product, the real value of assisting the housing process is often 
ignored. Also, the standards for evaluating the success or effectiveness 
of a program are very different in each case. Evaluation of a "product"- 
oriented approach tends to focus on statistics: timeframe for delivery, 
conformance to contract standards, number of houses built, cost of the 
completed operation relative to the established budget, etc. When 
assistance is viewed as an "enabling” device, evaluation focuses on the 
program's effectiveness in leveraging housing construction, creating 
"reflow" funds that recirculate within the community, upgrading local 
construction standards and skills, enabling local institutions to set up 
systems that will improve local response capability in future disasters, 
etc.
As a way of presenting for consideration alternate program approaches 
that could be effective in the Pacific region, we have outlined six 
options. Five are classified as "enabling” strategies and one focuses on 
rapid response operations to deliver standard replacement, units.
A. Rapid Response: Delivery of Standard Units
Two approach options are discussed in this section, one using local 
contracting capabilities and a second using external capabilities. As a 
preface, the priority to deliver replacement housing units within a 
relatively short timeframe requires that approach options be thoroughly 
worked out beforehand in the pre-disaster planning process.
1. Local Contracting. The context for conducting program operations in 
the aftermath of a disaster is particularly important to understand in 
the developing countries of the Pacific region. FEMA’s program 
operations to replace housing units normally take place in either the 
transitional or reconstruction phases of recovery. While many emer­
gency needs have already been met by that time, major restoration 
efforts in both the public and private sectors are underway. Local 
resources including transportation, public utilities, qualified 
contractors and technicians, equipment, building materials and public 
agency support (such as a Public Works department) are often either 
unavailable or overcommitted in fully servicing the demands of a 
relatively large-scale relief operation.
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As stated earlier in this report, resources and logistical support are 
very limited in the best of times. Most local firms or agencies, 
whether they are public or private, are not highly-equipped. They may 
have limited technical and managerial capabilities and be unable to 
mobilize the required materials, personnel and equipment effectively 
or quickly.
The process of implementation in this region is very different from 
that of U.S.-based operations. Construction is inherently slow7er, 
there is no backup for equipment failure and, in more remote 
locations, use of power tools is limited if possible at all. These 
factors, coupled with a significantly different cultural perspective 
on time constraints, have significant impact on both the management 
and content of program operations.
Utilizing an approach of awarding contracts to local firms for con­
struction of multiple replacement housing units can in some cases be 
effective. The bidding process is, however, a problematic tool in 
assuring selection of the most capable firms. It is essential that 
the scale of the contract be within the normal scope of a contractor’s 
at*ilities and that the methods of construction be consistent with the 
firm’s technical skills capacity —  all of which can be very difficult 
for an agency from outside the country to assess.
Contracting firms should as a rule operate within their normal "terri­
torial boundaries. If experience in remote operations is not readily 
apparent, then the risk of problems during the construction process is 
much greater.
Equally significant is a knowledge of how the construction financing 
system operates within a particular country and of the contractor’s 
experience with local financial institutions. Contract awards should 
be consistent with past award levels.
Project monitoring is a critical area of focus for all housing program 
operations, particularly if FEMA maintains responsibility for conduc­
ting temporary housing assistance programs. As with any reconstruc­
tion program conducted in a remote region within a different cultural 
context, management and operations decisions are best made at the 
field operations level. Most of the problems that arise during opera­
tions cannot be accurately or quickly assessed by those not directly 
involved. This is one of the most common management problems among 
international relief organizations: how to structure a program with a 
balance of centralized and decentralized functions to meet the needs 
of both the organization and the beneficiaries of the program.
It is essential that agency personnel or qualified representatives 
maintain consistent on-site monitoring. If this presence cannot be 
maintained, then consideration should be given to structuring the 
program as either a state-run effort or a subcontract to an appro­
priate voluntary agency.
Another element that can affect the cost, productivity and quality of 
work is the design of replacement units. Two common problems should
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be avoided* complicated designs using specially-ordered or specially- 
fabricated components that are not available locally, and culturally- 
unacceptable designs. A third factor is the "over-design" of units, 
in terms of both structure and unit size. This again can lead to 
increased materials cost, longer fabrication time, and sometimes 
increased maintenance costs for the residents.
Replacement units should be simple designs with adequate, but not 
excessive, mitigation built in. Designs should be tested locally in 
terms of cultural acceptance, local availability of materials, and 
ease of construction.
2. Using External Resources and Capabilities. In order to meet a rapid 
response objective for delivering standard housing units in the 
region, the process is probably most efficient as an externally- 
organized and implemented response. Each phase and element of the 
delivery process must have dedicated resources. Unit types should be 
pre-designed with construction capabilities and resources identified 
in the pre-disaster planning process. It is critical for such pro­
grams to develop or have available the logistical support to service 
program needs. The specialized problems of conducting logistical 
operations in remote sites having no electricity, limited fresh water 
resources, limited lodging or field provisions, limited harbor 
facilities or landing fields, little or no communications equipment, 
cultural and language differences must all be factored into the 
response mechanisms. The use of military capabilities, such as the 
Seabees, may be appropriate if the magnitude of the response warrants 
this sort of mobilization.
While some operations involving either the military or outside con­
tractors are conducted without the advantage of in-depth knowledge or 
experience with local conditions, issues involving land tenure or 
ownership of housing units and local political dynamics can create 
many problems. Care should be taken to integrate both local partici­
pation and experienced FEMA field operations staff in the planning and 
conduct of the program, to provide guidance and bridge cultural gaps.
As in any program involving the delivery of standard housing units, 
cultural acceptability and environmental suitability should be tested 
and evaluated prior to a post-disaster response.
This approach should be developed as one option among several, as each 
event may warrant a different form of response. Dependence on any 
single approach will not address the issue of providing more appro­
priate and effective assistance.
The opportunities with this approach include:
--  potential for rapid response;
--  coordinated, single-focus process;
--- dedicated material and logistical support;
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--  limited FEMA involvement;
--  dedicated technical and managerial resources.
Constraints with this approach include:
--  little or no effect on overall long-term recovery;
--  cost of operations;
--  no participation or input by local victims, thus no feeling of
local "investment" in ensuring program success;
--  no significant contribution to local economy —  bypasses local
tradesmen, material suppliers, etc.;
--  no contribution to local developmental context;
creates dependence on external solutions to local problems.
B. Enabling Strategies
1* Provision of Construction Materials. In this approach, victims would 
be responsible for erecting their own units, either through self-help 
construction or contracted labor. FEMA would assist by providing a 
grant in the form of construction materials and the transportation of 
materials to the site.
In almost every island visited, there appears to be sufficient local 
capability to provide the labor component of the building process. 
FEMA’s assistance would target the most inaccessible component of 
reconstruction for the majority of families affected: the acquisition 
of materials. Since banks are for the most part non-participants in 
local housing markets, the ability to gain access to long-term loans 
for building materials is virtually non-existent. In all of our 
surveys, any government housing programs that were in operation were 
both understaffed and underfunded.
Several elements are critical to implementing a successful program:
a. providing the appropriate materials: The technical assistants to
program staff must evaluate the completeness of materials 
requests. Normally field inspectors review requests with fami­
lies confirming their accuracy and completeness. Often field 
staff require that the contractor or tradesman responsible for 
constructing the house provide the materials list.
b. ensuring the availability of materials: One of the most frequent
causes of delay in project implementation is the unavailability 
of required building materials. With this type of approach, 
responsibility for coordinating availability locally and region­
ally would be a primary task for program administrators. Pre- 
disaster planning will identify resources, typical stocks and 
normal time constraints for reordering and delivery.
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c. ensuring transport: Materials transport is a significant com­
ponent of the implementation process. Local transportation 
capabilities vary from country to country; however, one can 
generalize that servicing the outer islands in most countries is 
extremely difficult. The long distance coupled with limited 
local vessel capacity can contribute significantly to the 
delivery timeframe, as can weather conditions which may prevent 
delivery for days or weeks.
The initial assessment data collected after a disaster should 
begin to build the logistical context for potential program 
operations. Since this form of housing assistance is operational 
during the transitional and reconstruction phases, it is impor­
tant to chart the planned sequence of activities. If regional or 
mainland logistical support will be needed to supplement local 
capabilities, materials orders must be complete and availability 
must be assured before this support arrives. It is essential 
that appropriate types of vessels are identified beforehand. The 
availability of dock (or airfield) facilities, harbor character­
istics, and off-loading requirements/capacity will determine the 
appropriateness of logistical support equipment. Any anticipated 
supplemental assistance should be identified and evaluated during 
preparedness planning.
Operations staff must clearly delineate the areas of responsi­
bility for getting materials to the site. On outer islands, the 
program may only be responsible for delivering materials at the 
point of off-load.ing. Or it might be necessary to establish 
materials yards or storage facilities for bulk materials, with 
security and record-keeping systems, until they are distributed 
or picked up by the recipients. Operations policies and proce­
dures should establish a clear, workable method of transfering 
responsibility to the recipients.
When project operations are conducted on an island where major 
materials suppliers and overland transportation resources are 
available, the structure of the program may be very different. 
Families may be given responsibility for coordinating their own 
transportation arrangements.
d. setting priorities for areas of operation: The establishment of
priority areas in the structuring of program operations allows 
both materials suppliers and operations staff to concentrate on 
the implementation of program activities in a coherent way.
Since the phase of recovery is usually transitional, emergency 
response pressures are somewhat relieved. If the efforts of the 
field staff become too widely-dispersed, management of overall 
operations may suffer. When specific objectives are established 
that prioritize the different areas of operation, planning and 
coordination efforts can be managed in a more effective way.
This is particularly critical when establishing program expecta­
tions .
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Using this type of approach, opportunities exist in the following 
ways:
--  assistance helps victims recover in a way that addresses longer-
term developmental goals.
--  each family is able to determine the appropriate type of housing
to meet their needs. Past experience has shown that p>eople will 
build what they can afford. With the contribution of basic 
materials, a family is in a better position to construct a 
higher-quality house.
program operations can focus on a single level of assistance, 
avoiding the complex process of coordinating construction and 
delivery of housing units.
--  the aid does not replace people’s internal coping abilities.
--  this form of assistance does not require large-scale mobiliza­
tion.
--  the program can use local materials suppliers.
--  the program can create employment opportunities for local trades­
men.
--- it can use local lending institutions, public or private, in
program administration.
Constraints with this type of approach include:
--  limited opportunities to promote mitigation techniques in the
housing reconstruction process.
--- little or no quality control in construction.
--  difficulty in assuring materials delivery to remote outer
islands.
2. Aided Self-Help. Aided self-help programs incorporate a technical
assistance component into the materials provision program. Technical 
assistance addresses the need for upgrading skills and improving 
vulnerable construction methods. Incorporating mitigation concepts 
and techniques into the reconstruction process is the primary goal for 
technical assistance here. This type of program has gained wide 
acceptance as a standard program approach for international relief and 
development agencies. The AID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assis­
tance and OXFAM, for example, have both used this methodology with 
highly successful results.
Primary objectives include:
a. encouraging and monitoring the use of hurricane clips or strap­
ping for frame construction.
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b. teaching the proper use of reinforcing steel in concrete and 
masonry construction.
c. improving critical joints and construction connections.
d. incorporating appropriate bracing techniques.
e. communicating why and how particular methods and techniques work.
The basic structure to the aided self-help program would be the same 
as for materials assistance, augmented by a structured training com­
ponent for local tradesmen as well as local project managers involved 
in the field operations.
Normally, these sessions are conducted in separate localities where 
assistance programs are targeted. Local tradesmen who are responsible 
for construction are paid to participate in the training sessions.
One method that has proven successful (used in the Solomon Islands, 
Peru, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Madagascar, Yemen, etc.) 
is to construct a community building or a house for a disaster victim, 
using the process as a demonstration of mitigation techniques. This 
"model" construction reinforces the concepts and provides opportuni­
ties for local tradesmen and the public to see and discuss the methods 
in use.
It is important to adapt techniques and methods so that they are 
easily transferable to local housing types and are consistent with 
local capabilities and available materials.
Teaching mitigation techniques and methods is successful when there is 
local interest and receptivity to the information. Generally, the 
awareness is highest in the aftermath of a disaster. Housing recon­
struction often represents the single greatest opportunity to reduce 
vulnerability to disasters. By investing the training and information 
with local tradesmen who are the primary builders in a community, 
there is a much better chance that improved construction techniques 
will be integrated into the normal building process, thus continuing 
the positive impact of such a program far beyond the project period.
Incorporating a "certification" element for local tradesmen helps 
raise the status of participants and extends the value of the 
training. It is also a way to establish a repository of locally- 
trained tradesmen who can be called on upon in the next disaster or 
used to help train others within the region.
Appropriate training and public awareness information materials should 
be developed as part of the overall program. It is essential that 
these materials be developed within the context of a particular 
country. Not only are some of the techniques to be conveyed different 
for different countries or even different areas within a country, but 
also the way that local people perceive graphic information may be 
very different from what was intended. Regional languages, local 
housing styles and construction techniques, and literacy profiles
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should guide the format and content of both training and public aware­
ness materials. Local communications issues should be addressed prior 
to disaster response activities. The appendices to this report con­
tain further information on relevant training program structures and 
content.
Opportunities for effective intervention with this approach include!
--  potential to progressively reduce vulnerability by teaching
improved building techniques and skills to those traditionally 
responsible for housing construction.
--  creation of local employment opportunities.
--  establishment of a local resource that could be called on to
assist programs in the future.
increased public awareness of mitigation and preparedness 
methods.
--  promotion of self-reliance as opposed to dependence on external
resources and knowledge.
--  continued vesting of decision-making on housing styles and
materials in the community.
The constraints involved with this approach include:
--  potential difficulties in transporting materials for training
exercises in remote islands.
--  coordination of training to coincide with materials assistance
grants.
--  coordination with local agencies for program support.
--- availability of qualified technical assistance staff.
--  provision of food and lodging for staff in remote locations.
Establishment of Construction Teams to Rebuild Housing. This approach 
assumes the responsibility of rebuilding housing for disaster vic­
tims. By using designated construction teams, it is possible to build 
standard units that are replicable from area to area. The housing 
program can then incorporate mitigation directly into the controlled 
process of rebuilding. Since appropriate units can be designed during 
the pre-disaster planning process, the required materials for a 
particular response can be projected relatively quickly and savings 
may be achieved in costs for any bulk purchase of necessary materials.
Program success depends greatly on pre-disaster planning to structure 
the separate activities. Materials assistance logistics are combined
with field construction activities. Local coordination and partici­
pation are also key elements. Training of local teams should be 
coordinated with materials delivery so that the initial construction 
of a demonstration house is the first in a continuing process of 
rebuilding units. If there is a large gap in timing between training 
and reconstruction, coordination and public support may become 
issues. Again, it is important to prioritize areas and concentrate 
program resources.
Designated reconstruction teams should be trained by FEMA staff/agents 
in both concepts and techniques. Local team supervisors or leaders 
are particularly important and can provide an ongoing resource to FEMA 
for future responses either within the country or elsewhere in the 
region. Reconstruction teams should operate as much as possible with­
in their normal communities. The required logistical field support is 
much more manageable. It is possible that only one or two skilled 
tradesmen can form the core of a team in a given locality. FEMA could 
elect to construct only the floor, frame and roof of a unit ("core” 
housing concept) and let the residents fill in the windows and walls.
In Majuro, the Department of Education constructs its schools in the 
outer islands by hiring a local tradesman to coordinate and supervise 
the process. In many cases, the tradesmen are volunteer labor. The 
Dept, of Education is responsible for shipping all materials to the 
site.
The use of designated construction teams is another concept that is 
gaining acceptance among international relief agencies. INTERTECT 
successfully used this method as part of an AID/OFDA materials distri­
bution and housing reconstruction project in Madagascar following the 
1984 Cyclone Kamisy. The significant impact of the Madagascar project 
lies in the fact that transition from the INTERTECT team to a local 
team was built into the program design. After the AID/OFDA project 
ended, another cyclone hit this island country the following year; 
instead of depending totally on external technical assistance pro­
grams, the local Cyclone Kamisy Team trained during the OFDA project 
was available, had the necessary construction/repair booklets and 
training aids, and responded immediately to local reconstruction 
needs. While this project had its share of problems and delays, it is 
an excellent example of an agency with a short-term, emergency mandate 
working within those constraints to build local response capability 
and provide a resource for long-term benefit. (See Appendix A.)
By structuring the response in this way, FEMA avoids the constraints 
of using more complex contracting approaches that require relatively 
sophisticated coordination and implementation capabilities. The con­
tracting process must include time for the bidding process, to esta­
blish the capabilities of contracting firms, to establish bonding, to 
identify and structure local project management, and to plan project 
monitoring.
Opportunities with this approach include:
--  direct control and management of reconstruction process.
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potential for increased efficiency and speed of program implemen­
tation .
--  integration of mitigation techniques.
--  establishment of locally-trained teams that can be called upon in
the future.
--  greater benefit achieved from funds committed to program manage­
ment .
--  potential to manage program with a high degree of local partici­
pation.
--  standardization of housing units and materials used.
--  increased public awareness of mitigation techniques.
Constraints in using this approach include:
--  difficulty in coordinating delivery of materials within esta­
blished timeframes.
--  need for coordination of three levels of program delivery:
materials delivery; training; construction management.
--  availability of skilled staff.
--  capacity of both agency and local staff to coordinate initial
training activities.
--  acceptance of standard unit designs by local residents.
--  increase in local expectations due to agency commitment to con­
struct the units.
4. Loans and Grants. These are considered as alternative strategies to 
setting up housing programs. Both grants and loans can be very 
effective as intervention strategies. Victims are assisted in a 
direct way that eliminates many program management issues. While both 
grant and loan approaches may be integrated with other approach 
options, such as aided self-help, these options must be locally admin­
istered. It is critical that the areas of responsibility in the 
administration of grants or loans be delegated to local agencies that 
normally service a particular component. Local banks, either private 
or public, can be used to provide a consistent structure for the 
financial component.
While FEMA has not operated a loan program as part of their response 
strategies, loans could be used to supplement grant assistance, 
allowing families to construct more permanent housing and upgrade 
materials. This is really a development link and could be operated by 
local government or agency entities. This approach might permit the
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local government to commit the 25% local share of program costs toward 
providing and administering a matching loan program for aid reci­
pients. FEMA program staff would not be required to manage or monitor 
the actual construction process for the houses built using loans; this 
would be the responsibility of the state. Furthermore, the residual 
loan payments could be designated to support ongoing preparedness and 
mitigation activities.
FEMA has experimented already with two approaches to grant programs in 
Truk. The grant award of up to $5,000 was allocated to victims in a 
lump sum based on damage assessment information. Recipients were then 
free to construct suitable replacement housing and were not subject to 
time constraints for expenditures.
In the relief assistance given to victims in Rota after Typhoon Kim, 
grants were deposited in savings accounts with a local bank. The use 
of funds was monitored through the construction process. FEMA con­
tracted with a local agency to provide inspection services and the 
inspector was required to sign each request for expenditure of funds 
during the construction process.
Both methods represent valid approaches depending on the level of 
expectations of the agency. Lump-sum grants do not guarantee the 
construction of replacement units within a defined time period. This 
approach is much like that of an insurance agency that issues a check 
to cover losses qualifying under their policy. Payment is given 
directly to the victims, which fulfills their obligation but does not 
guarantee when or how it will be spent.
Opportunities available with the lump-sum grant approach include:
--- delivery of rapid and direct assistance to the victims.
--  support to local vendors.
--- support to recovery and stabilization of local economies.
--  support/expansion of local employment opportunities.
--- definition of housing needs left up to recipients.
--- avoidance of costly intervention programs and heavy investment in
management/administration.
Constraints include:
--- availability of materials not ensured.
--- assistance not necessarily offered for any needed transport of
materials.
--- reduced hazard vulnerability not ensured for replacement housing.
--- perhaps insufficient "accountability” for FEMA.
The controlled grant approach provides a somewhat expanded range of 
opportunities:
--  support to local vendors.
--  support/expansion of local employment opportunities.
--  means of quality control.
--  means of monitoring project activities.
--  utilization of local institutional capabilities.
--  decision-making on culturally-acceptable house left up to
recipients.
--  skills improvement components may be included.
--  mitigation (training in concepts, techniques) may be included.
--  many costly program implementation requirements eliminated.
Potential constraints to the controlled grant approach include:
--  access to local banks (particularly an issue in rural outer
islands where materials delivery is difficult and cannot be 
easily staged, and long time periods between payments are 
anticipated).
--  local availability of qualified inspectors/managers.
--  access to building materials.
--  access to locally-skilled labor.
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VI. ISSUES IN FOOD ASSISTANCE
The provision of appropriate food assistance after disasters relies on 
accurate assessment of damage and needs, and detailed information collec­
tion during the pre-disaster planning process. If a good base of data is 
gathered on normal diet, crops and harvesting seasons, the percentage of 
normal food imports, food stocks in individual or commercial storage, 
etc., this can be meshed with a vulnerability analysis to give an overview 
of potential needs in the event of a disaster. From this, site-specific 
lists of basic food items can be prepared, together with a list of 
resources (local, regional and national) for those items. A good post­
disaster assessment will add the specifics of what is needed, where, and 
in what quantity, and can be checked against the pre-disaster lists for 
completeness and nearby resources that can provide the food when it is 
necessary.
Earthquakes do not generally destroy food supplies; cyclonic storms 
and floods, even major ones, rarely create immediate, widespread need for 
sustained supplies of emergency food. Exceptions are small islands with 
limited food supplies, low-lying areas with mono-culture economies, and 
areas where agriculture is geared to the export market; in these cases, 
certain food items may be damaged or destroyed, or the ability to acquire 
food from normal suppliers may be delayed.
It is important for emergency program managers to remember that food 
availability sometimes actually increases temporarily following cyclonic 
storms or floods. Food from tree crops or vegetables may be blown off the 
plant, or root crops may be uprooted. While food may not be an immediate 
need, the situation still requires monitoring as lead times for food pro­
curement are characteristically long.
A. Pre-Disaster Planning/Vulnerability Analysis
Food aid can be critical for survival, or it can be an assumed and 
unnecessary response with detrimental effects on the overall recovery of a 
community. Efforts to ensure that it is needed, appropriate to those 
needs, and provided on a timely basis so long as a real need exists, 
should be firmly grounded in specifically-relevant information gathered 
during the pre-disaster period. Baseline data and a vulnerability analy­
sis together provide an excellent resource for decision-making during an 
emergency.
Baseline data to be collected include: basic local dietary habits; 
means of acquiring food (both urban and rural); types and seasons of food 
crops; location and capacity of individual, commercial and government food 
storage facilities; percentage and types of imported food items; maps; 
climatic information; data on the organization of national and local 
governmental agricultural agencies; lists of key people to contact for 
reliable assistance and information; lists of agricultural service groups 
(co-ops, growers’ associations, etc.); and other information relevant to 
the specific region or country.
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A vulnerability analysis can determine the potential for food crop 
losses and delays in transport that would affect food availability 
following a disaster. It adds to the baseline data information on: 
typical types of damage to which local crops are at risk; potential for 
salvage; previous disaster history and high-risk areas; status of local 
preparedness; recommendations for protection of food crops and food stocks 
in storage; vulnerability of local transport; etc.
A third critical component in the pre-disaster planning process is the 
designation of an appropriate distribution structure through which emer­
gency food assistance can be delivered to those who need it. Local 
networks should be identified in advance, their capacities and constraints 
noted, and the information updated regularly in order to avoid basing 
emergency decisions on outdated information. For example, the traditional 
school feeding programs sponsored by USDA are not being re-funded in the 
coming years for many states who have ratified compacts/agreements with 
the U.S. Alternate resources and approaches can be explored and new 
methods worked out with the state governments. The absence of Red Cross 
organizations in some countries, and the uncommitted status of the Inter­
national Red Cross in replacing the American Red Cross within the compact 
signatories, create a void in traditional response capabilities.
While it makes sense to vest program responsibility for food assis­
tance programs with each state, a clear definition of the implementation 
strategy and structure should be worked out in advance.
B. Damage and Needs Assessment
Initial indications that may dictate an emergency food response are:
--  where basic food supplies in commercial or government storage
silos or warehouses have been destroyed;
--  where the majority of food in small farm storage bins has been
lost or damaged;
--- where a high percentage of mature food crops standing in fields
has been destroyed;
--  where access to food supplies has been prevented.
Assessment in this sector must determine the change in food avail­
ability relating to large commercial or government storage facilities, 
personal household food stocks, field crops and transport/marketing 
access. Assessment priorities include determination of the types and 
amounts of food crops affected, estimation of the types and amounts of 
crops salvaged or salvageable, estimation of the total food supply avail­
able, and estimation of the number and location of people who need 
temporary basic food assistance. Assessment should also identify any 
immediate actions required to minimize or avoid further damages or losses 
to the local food supply.
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Problems in achieving an accurate assessment of food needs can be 
considerably reduced with the establishment of thorough pre-disaster 
planning and vulnerability analysis, and with the use of pre-designated 
local or locally-knowledgeable and reliable assessors who are well-briefed 
on the terminology and methodology to be used in both assessing and 
reporting status and needs.
C. Food Assistance Response
The majority of the Pacific countries surveyed are greatly affected by 
social, cultural and economic transitions. Many have experienced radical 
changes in traditional values and customs with each successive foreign 
occupation. The infusion of different economic and political systems has 
significantly altered the patterns of traditional relationships: how they 
interact with one another and their ways of sustaining life. As an out­
sider, you see it in the overt contradictions of everyday life —  the 
juxtaposition of western technology within a remote rural village; adapta­
tions of language, clothing, housing; and the restructuring of the way 
people live with their environment. Societies that not so long ago sus­
tained themselves primarily by subsistence farming and fishing are now 
importing more food than they grow.
It was beyond the scope of our initial survey to determine what con­
stitutes characteristic local diets. We know that in more urbanized 
areas, people depend less and less on local provisions, opting instead to 
buy more imported foods. This is also true to some extent in some rural 
areas and outer islands. What is not clear is exactly how local produc­
tion of food fits into the overall diet norm, both nutritionally and 
economically.
If the damage assessment is to yield an accurate analysis of need, 
then a comprehensive base of information must be developed as outlined 
earlier, either during the process of producing the Country Profiles or as 
a separate but related activity. What we may view as traditional cash 
crops, such as copra, may be used more as subsistence crops if storm 
surges or flooding destroy traditional subsistence crops. The increased 
use of copra to meet subsistence needs can often drain the income­
generating potential of a local agricultural economy. The long-term 
impact of re-establishing crop production should be defined relative to 
normal diets, procurement methods (self-grown, cash crop, trade, etc.) and 
type of crop (subsistence or cash crop). A much clearer picture for long­
term recovery needs will result, and an accurate projection of appropriate 
food types to be provided, if necessary, can be produced.
The impact of long-term feeding programs can have a regressive effect 
on long-term recovery efforts. Economies throughout the Pacific terri­
tories are largely dependent on one or two employment opportunities: 
usually the government and a local industry, if one exists at all. The 
stability of important local services such as markets and shop owners is 
largely dependent on this fragile economic structure. We have seen in 
other situations that shop owners are often forced to compete with relief 
programs to sell their goods. If food assistance programs are maintained 
beyond the point of the emergency, many small shop owners may find
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themselves with no income, and farmers have no market for the crops that 
they must sell to survive and to replant their crops.
In exploring options for providing more appropriate and effective food 
assistance, program strategies should be designed as much as is feasible 
to use existing food distribution networks such as local shop owners as 
conduits for delivering longer-term food assistance. Resources for basic 
food items should be sought locally and regionally before ordering from 
U.S. sources, if possible; this usually cuts the cost and time required, 
and keeps the money circulating within the local and regional economies. 
Also, imported food commodities that are normally purchased through local 
vendors rather than those items produced and sold locally should be 
evaluated relative to the overall economic impact in a particular locality 
once the need for emergency feeding has passed.
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VII. PROGRAM CONSIDERATIONS
As each Pacific state moves toward increased autonomy through the 
negotiated compact agreements, the need for linkages between relief pro­
grams and development programs becomes even greater. With such narrow 
economic bases and limited indigenous resources, the western Pacific 
region will continue to face very tough developmental issues.
The vulnerability of each island can be expected to increase at a 
rapid pace as populations grow more dense, as settlements and economic 
endeavors encroach into less desirable and unsafe sites, and as resources 
and employment opportunities are spread thinner and thinner. The gap 
between high and low incomes is likely to grow, increasing the conditions 
of poverty (one of the root causes of vulnerability), and FEMA can anti­
cipate disasters of correspondingly larger proportions. This issue has 
emerged as a central concern of international disaster assistance 
agencies.
Third World disasters...will demand increasing amounts of in­
ternational attention in the future. Traditional relief will 
continue to be a major part of the international response. But 
to at least slow the rate of increase in disasters, governments 
and aid donors will have to recognise the human hand in causing 
these catastrophes, and stop treating each disaster only as a 
logistical exercise in moving men and equipment. Whenever 
possible, short-term assistance should be linked to longer-term 
improvements aimed at disaster prevention. [Natural Disasters:
Acts of God or Acts of Man?, Anders Wijkman and Lloyd Timber- 
lake, Earthscan, 1984, p. 105]
In our relief work we are fighting a losing battle. Disaster 
relief must be continued and developed. But some new aspects 
—  preparedness and prevention —  must be added. [Statement by 
Mr. M ’Hamed Essaafi, UN Disaster Relief Coordinator, Ibid., p.
140]
Given the spiraling costs of disaster recovery efforts, the roles of 
preparedness and mitigation are seen as critical links to reducing vulner­
ability, which in turn will reduce the potential magnitude of relief 
responses.
As an advocate for preparedness and mitigation, FEMA could broaden its 
pre-disaster activities to begin to establish links with existing develop­
ment programs. Institutions operating at the local level can be very 
effective in promoting mitigation. For example, while there are Farmers 
Home Administration offices in almost every island surveyed, none of them 
require or actively encourage specific mitigation techniques or mater­
ials when issuing housing improvement loans.
This is also true of the local housing authorities surveyed, as well 
as the local development banks —  all active to some degree in the housing 
sector. This holds true for much of the public sector construction as
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well. All are potentially important factors in reducing overall vulner­
ability within the normal developmental context.
What was clear during the regional survey is that the greatest oppor­
tunities for establishing effective relief programs with a high degree of 
local administration reside more with local enabling institutions such as 
the development banks, private banks or FmHA offices than with existing 
private or government contracting capabilities. Establishing ongoing 
links and structuring potential response strategies with such agencies may 
also achieve long-term goals of reducing overall vulnerability.
One of the key factors for the success of this strategy is to provide 
the proper support so that the local institution is not overburdened in 
attempting to administer the relief assistance.
While it may not now work effectively within current procedures, the 
ability to combine temporary housing assistance with additional develop­
ment loans if a family wishes is an important consideration. The oppor­
tunity to upgrade the housing quality and to meet a family’s needs is 
advantageous to the victim and, in the long run, to FEMA. The problems of 
using FEMA money within a specified period may be resolved by structuring 
a program that would be administered by the state. As outlined in Section 
III, it is important to establish appropriate levels of funding awards 
based on what can be constructed within the local context. INTERTECT 
favors approaches that involve considerable effort by victims in ways that 
make sense economically and developmentally. Our initial feeling is that, 
in some cases, FEMA may be attempting to provide too much assistance in 
the form of housing reconstruction and food needs, both in the context of 
product (e.g., housing units) and responsibility for delivery. Finding 
more direct ways of intervention without assuming total responsibility is 
to us an appropriate goal.
Thus, while the recommendations in this report focus on specific data 
collection activities that will provide a base for both pre-disaster and 
emergency decision-making, we would also suggest that FEMA discuss in some 
depth what its responsibility is in terms of provision of assistance. 
Reaching a consensus will be useful not only for the Pacific region but 
for all FEMA-assisted areas. For example, studies currently in process of 
the Oct. 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquake are identifying problems in 
communicating necessary information and in responding to specific needs of 
different ethnic populations. In the future, FEMA may be faced with 
responding to questions such as: Is the goal of federal assistance to
provide temporary housing, period, or should this responsibility extend to 
providing the temporary housing in areas acceptable and desirable to 
different ethnic groups? Is FEMA required to take into consideration the 
fact that some ethnic groups may wish to be housed according to local 
cultural settlement patterns rather than taking whatever is available? 
Social, religious and ethnic differences within a society are a common 
source of relief and recovery problems in many developing countries and 
are a primary reason for the emphasis on the terms "appropriate” and 
"equitable" in many recently-written guidelines for international relief. 
The extent to which post-disaster assistance can or should meet 
non-homogeneous needs here in the United States is an issue that deserves 
attention now in order to defuse problems and criticism that could arise 
in future disasters.
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The sociological and behavioral research that is now highlighting both 
new "tactical'' problems (such as urgent communications with non-English 
speakers) and more philosophical issues (such as accountability to the 
disaster victims) has been conducted for some time but is relatively new 
in terms of recognition. Until the 1980s, most evaluations of relief 
focused on the provision of goods and services in terms of quantity, cost 
and timing, so that efforts to improve the international relief system in 
turn concentrated on improving the speed and efficiency of assistance 
operations. More comprehensive studies during this decade have included 
longitudinal evaluations of the social and economic impact of relief aid, 
raising new issues of quality, appropriateness and long-term cause-and- 
effect relationships. Agencies that previously reported to donors how 
much was provided and how many people were served now are being queried 
about creating dependencies on outside aid, about using paternalistic 
approaches, and about inadvertently creating "secondary disasters" through 
their well-intentioned intervention in a humanitarian cause (e.g., the 
congestion of both needed and unneeded relief items in Armenia). The 
application of developmental criteria to international relief operations 
is only just beginning to produce some results, and those primarily in the 
realm of undertaking more thorough and better-designed needs assessments.
This expansion of program evaluation criteria also has fundamental 
implications for overall emergency management: what may seem to be the
most cost-effective and efficient tactical approach can sometimes be much 
less useful or downright harmful from the perspective of the intended 
beneficiaries, and thus not cost-effective in the long run. So periodic 
review of an agency’s goals and operational approaches becomes necessary 
for both practical economic reasons and developmentally-sensitive reasons.
The development of our federal disaster assistance system has for the 
most part been based on the coordination of different levels of public and 
private support to assist a population that has some knowledge of what is 
available and how to function within the system. We are not accustomed to 
applying what are recognized internationally as "developmental" criteria 
to our own society. Yet with an growing proportion of residents entering 
the U.S. with different languages, cultural traditions and disaster exper­
ience, many of the issues being faced on the international level will have 
to be taken into account within our existing assistance framework. We are 
not by any means suggesting that FEMA curtail the flexibility of its man­
date by too much definition; but we do feel that a rethinking of the 
general extent of responsibility would be valuable, given the variations 
in needs and customs in large ethnic concentrations in some states and in 
areas such as the western Pacific and Caribbean, as well as a review of 
the internal evaluation criteria applied to program activities. In view 
of the long-standing international pattern of reaction rather than of 
forward planning, these discussions may enable FEMA to anticipate and thus 
avoid some of the problems that could arise in the future.
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SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF MADAGASCAR MATERIALS DISTRIBUTION 
AND HOUSING RECONSIRUCTION/EDUCATION PROGRAM
This project illustrates an effort to apply a mix of program 
approaches —  materials distribution, an educational program for 
builders and homeowners on improved techniques for wind resistance, 
support to existing and new local micro-enterprise development related 
to the program, and transition to a trained local team —  within the 
short-term funding constraints of AID/OFDA, that would initiate a base 
of long-term preparedness and mitigation activities in an island 
country at high risk of cyclonic storms and flooding.
FINAL REPORT:
EMERGENCY SIIELTER-TO-HOUSING PROGRAM, MADAGASCAR 
AID Contract No. ASB-0000-C-00-4174-00
I.  INTRODUCTION
.,  • °.n .A P r i 1  1 984,  Cyclone Kamisy struck Northern Madagascar in
n / a t V ^ n f  a" d ’ —  ^
tk  S Ih  , P° r t  ° f  Mahajan« a s evera l  hundred mi les  to
urban  a r e a *  a C y C l ° ne caused damage to s tructures  in the
r u r a l  z o n e s  n f " t  a x t en s l v e . dama8a Co rura l  housing in the surrounding 
t 2 V  both “ - . u n i t i e s .  The o b j e c t i v e  o f  the p ro jec t  was to 
a s s i s t  t h e  Government o f  the Democratic Republic o f  Madagascar (GDRM)
° f . « ; ° u 8 i n 8  focused on the z x
r ~ i c y c l o n e  damaged d w e l l i n g s  u s i n g  appropr ia te
t earn" 10 ° ^ y * .U" der the terms of  the contract INTERTECT sent a two-man 
ass is tan ce^ an d  i t e c h n i c a l  and s t a f f  t r a i n i n g ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
* guicanee in the design of  educational  m a te r ia ls .
Rnn iTa %  I n J:ertec, :  consultants assigned to the Madagascar p ro jec t  were
Phas e s  r  ^  and Kent  Hard in .  They were ass is t ed  in the 'p lann ing
A r c h i t e c t s  P a u ^ T h " " 1 *  rra ln in8 Alds S p e c i a l i s t  Juliana Marek and 
c n i t e c t s  I a u l  Thompson and A. James V i e t s .  The p r in c ip a l  P ro jec t
t h e 11 pos t -d i  •'ast der j Ck Wh° Vlslt:ed Madagascar i n i t i a l l y  to make
progress af  er h i  “ 8® assessm ent a" d a8ain to make an eva luat ion  of  I ogi. es s ut te r  the program was ope ra t ion a l .
I I .  DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
Hp q i  .  h \  Po s C—d i s a s t e r  damage assessment concluded that much o f  the
ma e r i a l s ' ° a nnd'aS ^  ^  b u i l d i " 8 techn iques , l ow -qua l i t y  bu i ld ing  
p ro g ra m  that  P° ° r “ nSt" uct loa methodologies.  The housing education 
so I ' ,  • !  u" dettaken al,ned to cor rec t  many o f  the d e f i c i e n c i e s
o f f i c i a l  ln bu i ld lns  cons truct ion .  The p ro jec t  t ra ined  government 
wind - I ’ prlVate  contrac tors  and ind iv idua l  buiders in how to adapt 
w ind -res is tan t  techno log ies  to l o ca l  housing types.
WaS A" emergency she 11 e r-1 o-hou s ing program that helped
d a m a g e d ° r t r  l a a S t e r  y l c t l n , s  t o  e rec t  emergency she l t e rs  or r epa i r  
damaged s t r u c t u r e s  t o  make them h ab i ta b le .  The r e b u i l t  or repa ired
C t u r ' ‘  incorporated  INTERTECT design m od i f i ca t ions  that made them
l e a r n e d  • ra° r e  7 ° lone> rea 1 s:t ant • Builders working with the p ro jec t  
t t r , “  i m p r o v e d  c o n s t r u c t i o n  m e t h o d s .  Homeowners  o b t a i n e d  
;  ! l l y , s °und " c o r e s "  wh i c h  c o u l d  be upgraded in to  future
n r n v i d e d  r a s i s t a n t pe r mane n t  h o u s i n g .  B u i l d i n g  mater ia ls  were 
a ui e P 1 ,a5 \0V a0St SO that Pe ° P le  could r epa i r  th e i r  damaged houses
. y - A n d ’ l n  o rdKr  f o r  the la rges t  amount o f  money poss ib le  to 
n in  c i r c u l a t i o n  and c o n t r i b u t e  to the recovery  o f  the lo ca l
F,Cn°dn0m5V  p r o c e e d s  E r 0"" the  sa le  o f  bu i ld ing  m ater ia ls  were used to 
einp oyment-ir i tensive community improvement p r o j e c t s .
HI. COORDINATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF MADAGASCAR
n
in  t H : VF ^ nT i a l  l in iUat ions  have kept the GDRM from being a c t i v e  
} * '  h o u s l n 8 f o r  many years .  The a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  post-
o p p o r t u n i t y  Mie WeSt p r e s e n t e d  s e v e r a l  m in is t r i e s  with an
o p p o r t u n i t y  to  become opera t iona l  aga in .  From the outset  there wa *•
c o n f u s i o n  as to which o f  the GDRM * s m in is t r i e s  was to be in charge ofH: ny r r structiT Pro8rara „ as t0-
Interior ' t l J  i ? thC personnel °f>: the Ministry of the
Housing Acen CN) Na, a I;raergency Committee), SEIMAD (the National
,„h m ' S - ? *  Cy ^ ’ CNC National  Coordinating Committee) andth e  M i n i s t r y  o f  Pub l i e  Wnrlfc , '> dUJ
of  thr>m cho \a u t ^orks. There were very good reasons why each
of them should have charge o f  the p r o j e c t .
, - h ^ Th,e “ nf !  dec is ion  b/  tl>e GDRM to run the recons truct ion  program 
u g l  P u b l i c  Works d id  no t  come u n t i l  mi d-November. While the
Even S‘' o "  th e  p en d l " « ’ 110 Personnel had been assigned to the program.' 
o f  th e  l b  C° r  atS conC,nued to coord inate  a c t i v i t i e s  with a l l  
c o u n t v  a i numer0us ",embers  o f  Madagascar reg iona l  ( s t a t e .
d i  s a s t e r - r e l  iUp8f 1 ’ tOUn ^  b 1 0 c k c o m m i t t e e s )  s t ruc tu re .  Had the 
r n nM° • , , l e f  ass istance  a r r ived  immediately a f t e r  the cyclone the
hav e  made a qu icke r  dec is ion  about which adm in is t ra t ive  
j  . ”  to use. Because funds came so l a t e ,  the emergency s i tua t ion
s a ige  y past,  and there was less  pressure to decide r igh t  away.
IV. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
The INTERTECT team had to overcome severa l  major obstac les  in 
r d e r  t o  s u c c e s s f u l l y  meet  the  terms o f  the cont rac t .  Though the 
eye  one s t r u c k  the is land in ear l y  A p r i l ,  the team did not a r r i v e  in
o f  agascar  .untLl i a t e  Ju]y> funds did not a r r i v e  f o r  the operat ion
th e  p ro jec t  u n t i l  mid-October.  When the funds f i n a l l y  a r r ived  the 
team was ^more than  t w o - t h i r d s  th rou gh  the con t rac t ,  s t i l l  hid no 
, an had been unable to begin many aspects o f  the work they were 
su p p o s ed  to  d o .  An important lesson to be learned from this  exper- 
prompt 18 t h a t  pOS t - d l  s a s t e r  response  is  most e f f e c t i v e  when i t  is
D u r in g  t h i s  period o f  uncer ta inty  and change, OFDA's unf lagg ing
u n n n ^ ' Wa8k f r e a t l y  ? p p r e c i a t e d  *>y INTERTECT. Perserverance was
&| 10na i y e s s e n t l a l to the eventual achievement o f  the t ra in ing  
program's goa ls .
D u r in g  most o f  t h.e c o n t r a c t  per iod ,  the INTERTECT consultants 
w e re  o c c u p i e d  by the d i f f i c u l t  task o f  t r y ing  to run a recons truct ion  
P - o j e c t  w i t h  no money and no personne l.  These l im i ta t i o n s  freed up 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  t i me  f o r  ■ e d u c a t i o n ,  p u b l i c  awareness and technology 
- n s f e r  h o w e v e r .  They also  provided the opportunity to es tab l i sh  
!  p r o f e s s i o n a  L and p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  members of
c1^ a s C a r  s e l i b e r a t e  l o c a l ,  nat iona l and reg iona l  adm in is t ra t iv e  
o r u c t u r e o .  These l inkages provided the support network, that helped 
T h e  p r o j e c t  g e t  mo v i ng  q u i c k l y  when a l l  t he  f i n a n c i a l  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  problems c leared up. Personal r e la t i on sh ips  are o f t en  a 
ma j o r  p r e r e q u i s i t e  o f  success in Third World f i e l d  programs and, in
v
th e  c a s e  o f  t he  Madagascar t r a in in g  p r o j e c t ,  good personal r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p s  c e r t a i n l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  to the reso lu t ion  o f  the i n s t i t u t i o n a l
V. SPECIFIC INTERTECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Design and Execution o f  the Housing Education Program
When. the M in is try  of  Public  Works became the execut ive  agency for 
th e  Ho u s i n g  E d u c a t i o n  Program, the INTERTECT consultants determined 
t h a t  t he  c r e a t i o n  o f  an in s t i t u t i o n a l  s tructure  capable o f  managing 
th e  p ro g ra m  a f t e r  th e i r  departure was the primary goa l .  Considerable 
e f f o r t  was e x p e n d e d  i n s e a r c h i n g  f o r  and t r a i n i n g  com m it t ed ,  
e n t h u s i a s t i c  s t a f f  persons. Although i t  was not poss ib le  to f in i sh  
th e  s t a f f i n g  w i t h i n  t he  l im i t a t i o n s  o f  the con t rac t ,  the INTERTECT 
c o n s u l t a n t s  s t a y e d  i n Ma d a g a s c a r  u n t i l  two reg iona l  o f f i c e s  ( in  
A n t s i r a n a n a  and Ma h a j a n g a )  we r e  s ta f f ed  and opera t iona l  under the 
s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  a n a t i o n a l  d i r e c t o r  (based in Antananar ivo ) .  I t  is 
i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t he  t he  o p e r a t i o n ' s  s u c c e s s  t h a t  t he  teams have 
c o n t i n u e d  t o  o p e r a t e  w i t h o u t  consultant superv is ion  and that AID/ 
Madagascar has continued the program past the o r i g in a l  c u to f f  date .
Construction o f  Model Houses
In  e v e r y  communi ty or neighborhood in which the housing program 
w o r k e d ,  i t  was the  p ra c t i c e  to build  at least  one and sometimes two 
mode l  houses (examples o f  new construct ion  and repa i r  of  damages). At 
th e  t i me  t he  c o n s u l t a n t s  l e f t ,  t h e r e  were 12 model construct ions 
f in i sh ed .  These bu i ld ings  served many purposes:
* They  p r o v i d e d  examples o f  c y c lo n e - r e s i s tan t  construct ion  
f o r  th e  wh o l e  c o mmun i t y .  Homeowners that were bu i ld ing  
c o u l d  r e f e r  t o  them when they had doubts about how to do 
p a r t i cu la r  d e t a i l s .
*  They  p r o v i d e d  t r a i n i n g  f o r  l o c a l  b u i l d  er s . Program 
i n s t r u c t o r s  c o u l d  work more e f f e c t i v e l y  on th e i r  t r a in ing  
when t he y  we r e  a l l  working on one job s i t e .  Watching them 
wor k  together provided elements o f  comparison when s e l e c t in g  
loca l  bu i lders  to become in s t ru c to r s .
*  They  conv inced  the community that the housing program was 
s e r i o u s ,  t h a t  i s ,  i t  was a c t u a l l y  g o i n g  to accomplish 
something.
S e v e r a l  a p p r o a c h e s  were t r i e d  in the construct ion  of  the model 
h o u s e s .  In some c a s e s ,  t he  ho us e s  we r e  b u i l t  under the d i r e c t  
s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  t he  c o n s u l t a n t s .  In other cases ,  the bu i lders  were 
a l l o w e d  to bui ld  unsupervised but in a compet it ion s i tu a t i o n ;  the best 
° f > th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n s  was dec lared the model house and e n t i t l e d  the 
bu i lder  to a spec ia l  p r i z e .  Both approaches were e f f e c t i v e .
Construction Ass istance
The H o u s i n g  E d u c a t i o n  P r o g r am put  t r a i n e d  b u i l d e r s  at the 
d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  homeowners fo r  the purpose of  rebu i ld ing  the frame and 
r o o f  on ly .  Where the communities were in favor  o f  working together  in 
g r o u p s ,  they were organ ized .  In other communities the. people did not 
want  t o  wor k  t o g e t h e r  and i t  was each f a m i l y ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to 
p r o v i d e  l a b o r  f o r  the program-paid bu i lders  ( t o  d ig  h o les ,  saw logs ,  
carry mat e r i a l s ,  e t c . ) .
The f i n i s h i n g  d e t a i l s  such as doors and windows, f l o o r s ,  and 
w a l l s  we r e  l e f t  t o  the fam i l i e s  to f in i sh  on th e i r  own. There were 
s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  f o r  r u n n i n g  the  p r o g r a m i n  t h i s  fashion.  Many 
f a m i l i e s  were impat ien t ly  await ing  the a r r i v a l  o f  the program bu i lders  
and i n s t r u c t o r s .  There was concern on the part o f  the GDRM that the 
p r o g r a m g e t  t he  maximum number  of  roo fs  up be fo re  the ra ins began 
a g a i n .  S i n c e  w e a l t h i e r  fam i l i e s  could a f f o r d  to purchase expensive 
m a t e r i a l s  which would requ ire  e laborate  f i n i s h in g ,  the amount o f  time 
s p e n t  by program bui lders  would vary g r e a t l y  i f  they stayed on the job 
u n t i l  each homeowner decided they could leave (and i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to 
j u s t i f y  t he  g r e a t l y  increased expense per ass is ted  f a m i l y ) .  Keeping 
th e  c o s t  pe r  hous e  v e r y  l ow was an important f a c t o r .  One of  the 
p r o g r a m g o a l s  was t o  d e mo n s t r a t e  to the GDRM that the owner-built  
approach  was an appropr ia te  way to work in low-cost housing throughout 
th e  c o u n t r y .  F i n a l l y ,  we were p r im ar i ly  concerned with the sa fe t y  of  
th e  h o u s e ;  the program b u i l t  a strong s tructure  but many people could 
only put on permanent wal ls  l a t e r  when they could a f f o r d  them.
Tra in ing  f o r  In s t ructors
Ex t e n s i v e  t ra in in g  f o r  in s t ruc to rs  was given on two l e v e l s :  (1 )  a 
r ao r e> techn ica l  course for  engineers and bu i ld ing  superv isors  from both 
p u b l i c  s e c t o r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and the p r iva te  construct ion  industry ,  and 
( 2 )  a more  bas ic  course designed lo r  carpenters  and masons that would 
wor k  w i t h  t he  program superv is ing  other bu i lders  and doing promotion 
work with the l o ca l  people .
The two reg ion a l  o f f i c e s  have spe c ia l i z e d  in s t ruc to rs  to continue 
the  t e c h n o l o g y  t r a n s f e r  p r o c e s s  begun by the consultants .  These 
i n s t r u c t o r s  a r e  w o r k i n g  i n  a l l  t he  v i l l a g e s  and urban d i s t r i c t s .  
S e v e r a l  i n s t r u c t o r  superv isors  were trained to coord inate  th e i r  work. 
They have  a l l  been tra ined in the s t ruc tura l  m od i f i c a t ions  which make 
the  t y p i c a l  b u i l d i n g  t y p e s  i n t he  a r e a  saf e  during extreme wind 
cond i t ions .
Of e q u a l  i m p o r t a n c e  i s the fact that the ins t ruc to rs  were a lso  
t r a i n e d  i n  the techniques o f  mot ivat ion  and the necess i ty  o f  teaching 
in  an i n f o r ma l  way. When c lasses are given to bu i lders  or ind iv idua l  
homeowners,  the group walks through town examining destroyed bui ld ings  
and d i s c u s s i n g  t he  causes o f  th e i r  f a i l u r e .  The actual  c lasses  are 
l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  be held in a formal classroom than to be held  under a 
t r e e ,  i n  the ruins o f  a cyc lone-destroyed  b u i ld ing ,  or in the v i l l a g e  
ma r ke t .
When c l a s s e s  are given to masons and carpenters ,  d e ta i l e d  models 
a r e  used t h a t  were produced by the ins t ruc to rs  under the superv is ion  
o f  th e  INTERTECT consultants .  There are a number of  f u l l - s i z e  models 
o f  wood j o in t s  ( inc lud ing  good and bad examples) .  One p a r t i cu la r  type 
o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  j o in t  was the reason that many bu i ld ings  f a i l e d ;  thus 
th e  i n s t r u c t o r s  e mp h a s i z e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  Scale-modeL 
b u i l d i n g s  have  a l s o  been made which use a l l  the c y c lo n e - r e s i s tan t  
m od i f i ca t ions  promoted by the Housing Education Program.
Tra in ing  Aids for  In s t ru c to rs
A 25-page  c o l o r  f l i p c h a r t ,  t o  be used as a v isua l  aid by the 
i n s t r u c t o r s ,  was developed by a l o ca l  a r t i s t  in coord inat ion  wi th the 
c o n s u l t a n t s .  The f l i p c h a r t  has  been c o n t i n u a l l y  i mp r o v e d  by 
. i e  Id t e s t i n g  as t he  ins t ruc to rs  work with the a r t i s t  to incorporate  
f e e d b a c k  f r om the l o ca l  people .  Two booklets  were printed in French 
as a d d i t i o n a l  t r a in ing  aids for  the in s t ru c to r s .  They are "What is  a 
Cyclone? and "Guide to Cyclone Res istant Construct ion" .
Ot he r  l e s s  f o r ma l  c lassroom aids were developed in conjunction 
w i t h  the in s t ru c to rs .  A p a r t i c u la r l y  e f f e c t i v e  one is  a logg ing  chain 
whi ch  t he  i n s t r u c t o r s  use t o  wrap up a learn ing sess ion .  With the 
c i a m  t h e y  demon s tate  how a cyclone r e s is tan t  house requ ires  a "chain 
o f  s e c u r i t y "  f rom the roo f  to below the ground (a chain is as strong 
as i t s  w e a k e s t  l i n k ) ;  each l i n k  o f  t he  chain r e c a l l s  one of  the 
t e c h n i q u e s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  c l a s s .  A model wa l l  was constructed with 
r e m o v a b l e  d i a g o n a l  b r a c i n g ;  t he  students d iscover  in a "hands-on" 
f a s h i o n  the d i f f e r e n c e  made by the brac ing .  The in s t ruc to rs  were also 
t a ug h t  how to blow on a piece o f  paper to demonstrate g ra ph ica l l y  how 
wi nd has  a s t r o n g  component o f  up l i f t  that has to be compensated fo r  
in  th e  roo f  structure.^ This type o f  " r e a l  l i f e "  t r a in in g  aid that was 
d e v e l o p e d  f o r  and w i t h  t he  i n s t r u c t o r s  i s  as im p o r ta n t  as the
f l i p c h a r t  or  p amph l e t s  in convincing loca l  people to change the way 
they bu i ld .
The in s t ru c to r s  were a lso  taught to use anything in the immediate 
e n v i r o n m e n t  t o  g e t  t h e i r  message accross .  By teaching them how to 
t e a c h  as w e l l  as what  t o  t e a c h ,  we i n t e n d e d  t h a t  t h e y  woul d  
c o n t i n u a l l y  i mp r o v e  t h e i r  s k i l l s  and become more  e f f e c t i v e  
i n s t r u c t o r s .  I t  takes more than in t e r e s t in g  words given in a formal 
c l a s s r o o m  t o  c o n v i n c e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p e o p l e  to change construct ion  
d e t a i l s  in th e i r  homes.
Community Awarcness Materia 1
The Ho u s i n g  E d u c a t i o n  P r o g r am d e s i g n e d  s ev e ra l  posters  and 
p a mp h l e t s  t o  i mp r o v e  public  awareness o f  the program i t s e l f  and the 
t o p i c  o f  safe housing in genera l .  A radio announcement was used for  a 
d r a ma t i c  s tar t -up  o f  the public awareness campaign. I t  exp la ined what 
th e  Programme de Reconstruction was and how to p a r t i c i p a t e  in i t .  The 
t e x t  o f  t he  announcement was printed in Malgache so that people would 
hav e  a w r i t t e n  c opy  o f  what  t he y  h e a r d .  In t h i s  manne r ,  the
Training Aids for Builders
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  g o s s i p  t h a t  can so o f t en  spr ing up among t r a d i t i o n a l  
p e o p l e s  was avoided. A blank poster was printed with a cyc lone- tossed  
v i l l a g e  d e p i c t e d  a t  t he  t o p ;  t h i s  was used by t he  p r og r am to 
communicate da i l y  b u l l e t in s  to the community. A poster  was printed to 
p r o mo t e  SEIMAD as a source o f  safe-hous ing in formation (but th is  was 
abando ne d  when i t  was d ec id ed  that SEIMAD would not work in recon­
s t r u c t i o n ) .  A pos te r ,  with a drawing o f  a home which incorporated  a l l  
t h e  sa fe-housing recomendations, was prepared and given out to a l l  the 
f am i l i e s  that bought bu i ld ing  mater ia ls  from the program.
Subsidized Sales Program
A n o t h e r  ma j o r  a c c o mp l i s h me n t  o f  t he  INTERTECT team was the 
c r e a t i o n  o f  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  system that enabled d isa s t e r  v ic t ims  to buy 
s u b s i d i z e d  bui  ld ing  m a te r ia l s .  There were a s e r ie s  o f  circumstances 
that made th is  aspect o f  the p ro jec t  very  d i f f i c u l t .
*  Demand for  mater ia ls  far  exceeded supply.  Corrugated iron 
r o o f i n g ,  cement and r oo f in g  na i l s  were in such short supply 
t h a t  a f l o u r i s h i n g  black ma r ke t dea l t  in these commo d i t i. e s 
at e x to r t i on a ry  p r i c e s .
*  The GDRM hoped  t h a t  t he  USAID program would be able to 
g i v e  some h e l p  to most of  the v i c t im s ,  in ether  words that 
the  l a r g e s t  number  p o s s i b l e  woul d  be ass is ted  with the 
funding a v a i l a b l e .
*  T h e r e  was no ha r d  c u r r e n c y  to buy ad d i t i on a l  mater ia ls  
o nce  t he  o r i g i n a l  supply ran out .  Since the Franc Malgache 
i s  a n o n - c o n v e r t i b l e  c u r r e n c y  t h a t  e v e n  many l o c a l  
b u s i n e s s e s  w i l l  not  a c c e p t ,  proceeds from the mater ia ls  
sales  could not be used to buy more m a te r ia ls .
Iu  th e  Antsiranana area, most o f  the cyclone v ic t ims were 
in  th e  r e mo t e  r u r a l  a r e a .  T h e r e  were no s to r e s ,  banks, 
s t o r a g e  or  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  to which d i s t r i b u t i o n  
could be sub-contracted .
The I NI ERTECT t eam o p t e d  f o r  a complex so lu t ion  that seems to 
hav e  wo r ke d  v e r y  w e l l .  To make s u r e  that as many actual  cyclone 
v i c t i m s  as p o s s i b l e  b e n e f i t t e d  by t he  p r o g r a m (and to keep the 
m a t e r i a l s  out  o f  the;  hands  o f  s p e c u l a t o r s ) ,  an exact census was 
u n d e r t a k e n  i n  t he  p r o v i n c e s  o f  An ts i ranana and Mahajanga. Every 
f a m i l y  t h a t  had l o s t . t h e i r ,  home or had a s evere ly  damaged home was 
i d e n t i f i e d .  A l l  those names were included on an o f f i c i a l  program l i s t  
and no one e l s e  was e l i g i b l e  t o  buy program m ate r ia l s .  Then to 
p r e v e n t  t h o s e  p e o p l e  i d e n t i f i e d  f r om b e i n g  ob l iga ted  to s e l l  to 
p o w e r f u l  s p e c u l a t o r s  ( and many examples o f  attempted coerc ion  were 
i d e n t i f i e d )  , t he  p eo p l e  who wanted to buy mater ia ls  had to agree to 
wor k  w i t h  pr og r am bu i lders  or under th e i r  superv is ion .  This ensured 
t h a t  t he  m a te r ia l s  that were sold went d i r e c t l y  in to  construct ion and 
n o t  i n t o  t he  b l a c k  ma r k e t .  An a d d i t i o n a l  advantage was that the 
p r o g r a m b u i l d e r s  could disseminate safe-housing techniques among the 
p e o p l e  who we r e  a c tu a l l y  cons truct ing ,  at the moment they were doing 
i t  .
E n s u r i n g  the  s e c u r i t y  o f  t he  m a t e r i a l s  was a constant pre­
o c c u p a t i o n .  The program dea l t  with only those companies that had a 
r e p u t a t i o n  f o r  h o n e s t y .  Gu a r a n t e e s  we r e  o b t a i n e d  f r om the  
w a r e h o u s e ! '  s ' to th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  they were respons ib le  for  the f u l l  
v a l u e  o f  t he  m a t e r i a l s  en t rus ted  to them. Because the warehousers 
c o u l d  pay f u l l  value f o r  the mater ia ls  and s t i l l  quadruple th e i r  money 
on th e  b l a c k  ma r k e t ,  i t  was necessary for  program personnel to make 
c o n t i n u a l  spot-checks.  In Mahajanga a d i s t r i b u t i o n  contract was made 
w i t h  t he  company Bonnet et F i l s ;  they were chosen because they made 
th e  c h e a p e s t  o f f e r  and gave the best guarantee o f  s e c u r i t y .  Even so, 
t h e y  r e c e i v e d  only  a week's supply o f  mater ia ls  at a time and had to 
pay i n t o  program accounts the f u l l  r e c e ip ts  be fore  the next shipment. 
A l s o  c he c k s  were made to make sure that they only sold to fam i l i e s  on 
the program's approved l i s t .
In Ant  s i  ra liana the only way to d i s t r i b u t e  to the rural  areas was 
t o  use p r o g r a m personne l .  Trucks were rented and mater ia ls  were
s o l d  o f f  t he  t r u c k  by l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s  working with program s t a f f .  
A c c o u n t s  had to balance in order f o r  the trucks to return to the same 
v i l l a g e  w i t h  more m a t e r i a l s .  P r o g r a m bui lders  and ex t en s ion is ts  
wo r ke d  wi th t he  v i l l a g e r s  who bought the subsidized mater ia ls  in the 
construct ion  of  c yc lon e - r e s i s tan t  housing.
I t  i s  unusual  to requ ire  such e laborate  secur i ty  procedures. I t  
i s  c e r t a i n l y  not  t he  way 1NTERTECT l i k e s  t o  ope ra te .  Whenever 
p o s s i b l e  i t  i s  p r e f e r a b l e  to bring in enough mater ia ls  to undermine 
th e  b l a c k  market, d i s t r ib u t e  through e x i s t i n g  l o ca l  in s t i t u t i o n s  such 
as c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  and al low d isa s te r  v ict ims to s e l f - s e l e c t ;  that i s ,  
buy up to  c e r t a i n  l i mi t s  according to the i r  needs and what they can 
a f f o r d .  I t  was n e c e s s a r y  t o  mai ntai n such e x t r a o r d in a r i l y  s t r i c t  
c o n t r o l s  b e c a u s e  o f  t he  s h o r t a g e  o f  m a t e r i a l s  r e l a t i v e  to the 
n a t i o n w i d e  demand and b e c a u s e  t he  p r o g r a m wa n t e d  t o  honor the 
commi t ment  t h a t  bo t h  t he  embassy  and GDRM f e l t  e x is ted  with the 
d i s a s t e r  v i c t i m s .  What  t he  Ho u s i n g  Education Program did was to 
j u g g l e  DEMAND u n t i l  i t  came in to  balance with a v a i l a b l e  SUPPLY. In 
o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t he  USAID m a t e r i a l s  r e a c h e d  the intended 
r e c i p i e n t s ,  i t  was necessary to operate in th is  time-consuming manner.
Small-Scale  M ic ro -En te rpr is es
I n d i v i d u a l  en t repreneu rs  in both Antsiranana and Mahajanga were 
e n c o u r a g e d  t o  s t a r t  . p r o d u c i n g  cyclone straps as a l im i ted  cot tage  
i n d u s t r y .  The p r o g r a m s o l d  t h e s e  s t r aps  at cost in the hopes o f  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  an o n g o i n g  market a f t e r  the subsid ized sales  o f  other 
m a t e r i a l s  e nd e d .  I t  was f e l t  that the, people would continue to buy 
and th e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  t o  produce i f  they learned to pay f u l l  price  
f r o m t he  b e g i n n i n g  f o r  t h e s e i m p o r t a n t  me t a l  s t r a p s .  Wri. t ten 
g u i d e l i n e s  for  the encouragement o f  m ic ro -en te rp r is es  were included in 
the manual presented to the GDRM.
Whe ne v e r  p o s s i b l e ,  the program used the se rv ic es  o f  l o ca l  small 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s .  A good p i c t u r e  o f  the condit ions  under which this  
pr og r am operated can be seen by the transport that was used. Wood was 
t r a n s p o r t e d  for  hundreds o f  miles up the coast from Morondave in small 
p r i v a t e l y - o w n e d  s a i l b o a t s ,  and v i l l a g e r s  carr ied  mater ia ls  in to  the 
countryside with indiv idually -owned oxca r ts .
VI. FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM
At th e  t i me  the J.NTERTECT consult ing  team departed Madagascar in 
Decembe r  1 984 ,  th e  p r o j e c t  was turned over to the superv is ion of  a 
n a t i o n a l  d i r e c t o r ,  with two reg iona l  o f f i c e s  continuing the t r a in in g ,  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  a s s i s t a n c e ,  subsid ized sa le  of bu i ld ing  m a te r ia l s ,  and 
re f low  p ro j e c t s .
One o f  th e  I NTERTECI  t eam members  i s  p lann ing  to return to 
Madagascar  in September 1985 and w i l l  be able to report  on the further- 
progress of  the p ro jec t  upon his return to the U.S.
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In a d d i t i o n  to the d i s a s t e r  preparedness  p r o j e c t s  recommended by 
Dale P u f f e n b e r g e r ,  with  which 1 concur, I  would l i k e  t o  sugges t  one o th e r .
The g e n e ra l  impress ion  o f  many peop le  w e ’ ve  ta lk ed  w i th  i s  th a t  the  l e v e l  
or p u b l i c  awareness concerning s a f e t y  in c y c lon es  i s  low h ere  in  Madagascar , -  
d e s p i t e  the r e c u r r in g  th r e a t .  We recommended an e d u ca t i o n a l  campain b eg in n in g  
in  the s c h o o l s .  In at l e a s t  one area ,  however,  USAID/Madagascar and OFDA 
have a l r e a d y  made some inroads in t o  the problem. The hous ing  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n '  
program a f t e r  Cyclone Kamisy, i n i t i a t e d  and supported by AID/OFDA, i n c lu ded  j 
an e d u c a t i o n a l  component to s e n s i t i z e  the p u b l i c  to the need f o r  w ind - !  ; | 
r e s i s t a n t  housing c o n s t ru e t id r f t . Teams o f  b u i l d e r s  were t r a i n e d  in  s a f e -  
b u i l d in g  techn iques  who then t r a in ed  o th e r s .  The program reached  the  p u b l i c  
a t  a v e ry  p e r s o n a l  l e v e l  and helped those who were among the most v u ln e r a b l e  
m  cyc lone  d i s a s t e r s .  Mr. Rakotomanga d e s c r ib e s  the p r o j e c t  as a s u c c e s s fu l !  
v en ture  which has now e vo lv ed  in to  a l o w - c o s t  h o u s in g ' deve lopment program.
ie s c a l e  o f  the p r o j e c t  was r e l a t i v e l y  sm a l l ,  however,  and i t  vac  l i m i t e d  ! 
to  the areas  most s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t e d  by Kamisy. A housing vulnerability 
a n a l y s i s  which would cover  the more dense ly  popula ted  c y c l o n e - p r o n e ’ a reas  
Oi tne country  would extend th i s  k in d . o f  ed u ca t i o n a l  program to  a l a r g e r  
segment o f  the p op u la t io n .  Mr. Rakotomanga th inks i t  would be b e n e f i c i a l .  
I n t e r t e c t ,  the consu l tan ts  who worked on the Kamisy p r o j e c t ,  would conduct 
the s tudy.  Perhaps th is  could somehow be l i n k e d  to the  Tamatave (Toamasina)  i 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  p r o j e c t  mentioned above. . USAID/Madagascar should  d ikeuss  t h i s  
w i th  Mr. Rakotomanga and RHUDO/ESA to  determine  i f  t h i s  should b e  a! p r i o r i t y !  
r eques t  f o r  OFDA preparedness  funding .  ,, ,jj. • ; ; j I •
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APPENDIX B:
SAMPLE OUTLINE OF ACTIVITIES FOR 
AN INTEGRATED VULNERABILITY REDUCTION PROGRAM
The attached outline was prepared several years ago for another agency 
in the process of exploring options for an integrated program, rather 
than simply providing discrete post-disaster housing assistance.
Their approach to date had been sectoral, and it was recognized that 
failure to take into account the relationships and interaction among 
the various sectors of a developing society played a critical role in 
the effectiveness of their previous efforts.
COMPREHENSIVE PREPAREDNESS PLANNING FOR THE REDUC­
TION OF VULNERABILITY OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 
IN DISASTER-PRONE AREAS
To reduce the. .Loss of lives and property in the event of a 
disaster through integrated economic, social and physical 
planning
INTRODUCTION:
1* Effects of disaster events on human settlements
2. Impact 01 disaster—related housing losses on current 
world housing deficit
3. Cost-effectiveness of preparedness activities vs. post­
disaster reconstruction/rehabilitation
4. Importance of integration of efforts (physical planning, 
financial assistance opportunities, regional coordination, 
local and national coordination between development— and 
disaster-related agencies/ministries, etc.)
DEVELOPMENT OF PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM:
1• Institutional framework for preparedness planning
a. Formulation of national housing safety policies
b. Designation of ’'lead agency" or ministry
c. Development of data management/communications/ 
linkages with other agencies/ministries involved 
(urban development, sites and services, housing/ 
construction, local development, etc.)
d. Compilation of resource lists for outside technical 
assistance, private sector financial programs, etc.
e. Formulation of specific program goals, including 
means of assessing achievement
f. Delegation of responsibility for various aspects 
of preparedness planning program (hazards mapping, 
site planning, assessment activities, building 
codes/standards, information dissemination, etc.)
2. Private sector involvement
a. Provision of program information to non-governmental 
agencies, financial institutions and foundations, 
housing and planning professionals, builders' asso­
ciations, local cooperatives, etc.
b. Integration of private sector assistance to the 
greatest extent possible at every level of the pro­
gram
c. Development of incentives to encourage private parti­
cipation (e.g. tax benefits, municipal prizes, 
training/certification awards, etc.)
3. Basic program activities
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
h.
Hazard mapping/vulnerability assessment (frequency/ 
return period/prevalence of different disaster types; 
current demographic trends and land use patterns; 
designation of high, moderate and .low risk areas) 
Evaluation of vulnerability of existing settlements 
by means of (a) above and damage distribution studies 
from past disaster events
Exploration of relocation options for vulnerable 
settlements, if any
Development of guidelines for future physical planning 
for new and existing settlements (including recommen- ' 
dations for site improvements such as windbreaks) 
Establishment, of early warning systems (hurricane fore" 
casting, seismic measurement and flood level equipment, 
etc.) and means to disseminate recognizable, meaningful 
warnings to the public
Identification of areas for which evacuation planning 
is necessary; selection of routes, safe areas or struc­
tures; dissemination of clear advance information of 
evacuation procedures
Preparation of specific emergency plans/procedures for 
government ministries and vital services (telecommuni­
cations, electricity, water supply, transportation, 
hospitals, etc.) and advance coordination of relief 
activities
Designation of a "National Preparedness Day" or week 
when plans and procedures are practiced by the public 
and the media participate in a general awareness 
campaign to promote understanding of disaster warnings 
and precautions.
4. Housing program activities
a .
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Assessment of vulnerability of both urban and rural 
housing types
Development of disaster resistant housing designs and 
construction methods for new construction 
Development of disaster resistant construction tech­
niques and methods for repair/strengthening/upgrading 
of existing structures
Development of training curriculum and teaching aids 
for builders, homeowners, architects, instructors, 
etc., to upgrade skills and learn new techniques 
Development of a range of financial assistance options, 
particularly for low-income families, for disaster 
resistant home improvements
Development and dissemination of promotional information 
to explain the need and encourage participation at all 
levels
Designation of pilot program area(s)
k.
l. 
m.
n.
o .
Implementation of training program for instructors 
Implementation of training programs for builders, 
homeowners, etc.
Promotion of incentives for participation (material 
subsidies, availability of financing options and 
technical assistance, community awards, etc.) 
Demonstration of model structures and of low-cost 
techniques for homeowner improvements 
Provision of technical assistance to builders as 
they begin to put new techniques into practice 
Review:
1) Ensure availability of any required materials, 
components, etc.
2) Ensure that technical manuals and training aids 
are comprehensible to the target groups and 
receive wide distribution
3) Ensure that techniques and skills required are 
left within the community and that ongoing tech­
nical assistance and/or training opportunities 
are available at end of program
4) Evaluate and revise/refine
Formulation and dissemination of building design stan­
dards and codes for disaster resistant construction 
(new and existing)
Regularly scheduled evaluation of the program and its 
presentat ion/acceptance
COMMON PROBLEMS
Perception of risk
Lack of innovative financial mechanisms, particularly for 
low-income families, which would encourage the repair and 
strengthening of existing housing to better resist disaster 
events
Lack of vulnerability assessment and development of per­
formance standards for some indigenous housing types 
Lack of low-cost methods, particularly for rural areas 
Problems with land tenure/ownership
Lack of national policies promoting housing safety and 
providing framework for overall program
Lack of holistic approach (policy development, financial 
assistance, promotion, training, technical assistance, 
involvement of all components of housing sector, etc.) 
which would result in integration of preparedness efforts 
in normal housing process

APPENDIX C:
SAMPLE CURRICULUM FOR HOUSING EDUCATION PROGRAM
An effective effort to teach new or improved housing construction 
techniques and methods has three objectives by which its eventual success 
or lack thereof is measured:
1. Clarity: it must be clear in its presentation and explanation of the
material, so that its audience understands the techniques and methods.
2. Substance: it must include practice, so that its audience knows how to 
do what it has learned.
3. Motivation: it must be persuasive in explaining why the application
of these techniques and methods is necessary, how they will benefit 
from using them in construction and repair.
In designing training programs to respond to local needs in developing 
countries, INTERTECT has generally addressed these objectives: by design­
ing simple, highly-illustrated booklets for classroom instruction, based 
on literacy and comprehension characteristics of the target audience; by 
including a supervised "hands-on" component using both scale-models and 
construction of model structures; and by using local media and other popu­
lar communications methods (video, film, posters, T-shirts) to promote and 
advertise the program.
The content to be covered in the curriculum needs to be limited. 
Attempts to teach too many new techniques usually result in overwhelming 
the participants. We have found that the best results come from selecting 
priority techniques, the ones that will give the most benefit at the least 
investment of time and money and that are fairly easy to incorporate into 
the normal building practices. The aim is to achieve the minimal inter­
vention needed to strengthen the housing within the local perception of 
acceptable risk.
Two other items should be included in the curriculum development. In 
training for instructors, it is important to emphasize good training tech­
niques as well as technical content, so that trainers will be effective in 
communicating the information and motivating others. And for all levels 
of training, it is important to include a skills upgrading component so 
that overall construction workmanship in the community is improved. Tech­
nical ly-correct techniques lose their effectiveness if the quality of 
workmanship is poor.
A. Sample Curriculum for Instructors
A curriculum developed to train trainers might be designed to take two 
weeks, depending upon the extent of information to be conveyed, followed 
by actual supervised construction.
1. Orientation. This would include a discussion of the overall goals and 
objectives of the program, the roles of any participating agencies or
institutions, and the role of "instructor". A general discussion of 
safe construction methods and techniques would follow, including an 
explanation and discussion of why they are needed.
Training aids for this segment might include a printed program des­
cription handout, a film or video on safe construction, and a pamphlet 
on "How to Build a Safe House” developed specifically for local 
housing types.
2. Introduction to Safe Construction. This segment would focus on class­
room discussion of elements of safe construction. Detailed explana­
tions of relevant building techniques would be introduced using, if 
possible, scale-models to illustrate each technique.
Training aids would include an instructor's version of "How to Build a 
Safe House" and other booklets on safe construction for particular 
building types, as well as the scale-models.
3. Vernacular Buildings. Classes would be presented on different types 
of local construction and how to build/repair/retrofit each type.
Field trips work well in this segment, where students participate in 
walk-around discussions of specific housing types and critique them 
for safety.
Useful training aids for this segment are instructor's versions of the 
booklets on safe housing construction for particular building types, 
and on the upgrading of existing buildings. For field trips, it is 
valuable to develop a booklet or pamphlet on evaluation, "How Safe is 
Your House?".
4* Training Techniques. These classes would include: introduction to the 
curriculum; techniques of instruction; information about which techni­
ques to stress in classroom and model construction activities; intro­
duction to the training aids and how to use them properly; introduc­
tion to preparation of classes and course outlines for topics not 
covered; and techniques for monitoring the progress of students.
A training aid can be developed as an "Instructor’s Manual”.
5. Review. A final class would review training procedures, followed by 
students practicing their presentation techniques with critiques by 
program staff.
6. Model House Construction. The classroom knowledge must be applied and 
practiced in construction or repair of actual structures, under the 
supervision of program staff.
B. Sample Curriculum for Contractors and Self-Builders
A sample curriculum for this audience might include one week of class­
room training and demonstrations, followed by actual construction or 
upgrading of a demonstration house under the supervision of an instructor.
(• Actual Construction. The theoretical and classroom training would 
then be followed by participation in actual construction, repair or 
modification of a house using the new building methods, under the 
supervision of the instructor.
The content of each training program will vary, of course, depending 
on the location and learning characteristics of the participants, as well 
as the different house types and materials used and the existing level of 
construction knowledge and skills in the community.
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